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ABSTRACT 
 
 Evidence of price correlations or cointegrations in timber markets is often interpreted as 
indicative of the competitiveness and efficiency of these markets. This conclusion is based on the 
assumptions that firms price F.O.B. and F.O.B. pricing in spatial markets is expected to yield 
results analogous to the usual competitive results in spaceless markets (i.e., firms set price equal 
marginal cost plus transportation costs). Competitive arbitrage is the error correction mechanism 
assumed through which spatial markets are linked. This conclusion could be misleading. In the 
presence of significant intra-regional transportation costs between spatially dispersed markets, 
firms have an incentive to exploit their spatial market power. Price correlations therefore may be 
consistent with other, non-competitive pricing schemes such as collusive basing point pricing. In 
this dissertation, we  model the economic impacts of oligopsony in the procurement of timber in 
the presence of significant intra-regional transportation costs and test it on three forest products 
(Pine Saw Timber (PST), Pine Chip and Saw (CNS) and Pine Pulpwood (PPW))  for seven U.S. 
south-eastern and south-central states using quarterly data from 1976 to 2009. We find that the 
south-east south central market region is not a single market. However, there is evidence of 
market integration between 6 to 33 percent of the markets depending on the product, with the 
most integration occurring in higher valued product markets (PST) as predicted by our theory. 
Price discrimination was found in 19 to 24 percent of the markets while collusive basing point 
pricing exists in 13 to 18 percent of the markets. There is also evidence to support the hypothesis 
that interpreting price cointegrations in timber markets as market integration could be misleading 
iii 
 
given evidence that 55 to 65 percent of basing point price regions also are cointegrated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 To my sister Angelina Domakyaareh Mornah, who paved the way for me and made sure I 
was never wanting throughout my education even if that meant sacrificing her own comfort to 
make me comfortable. 
 To my brother Bernard Mornah who offered endless support and encouragement 
throughout this journey. 
 To my professors who believed in me, encouraged and pushed me on, even at times that 
quitting seemed the most rational thing to do. 
 To my friends who helped me to overcome the frustrations and rigor of graduate school.  
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I owe a debt of gratitude to my supervisors William F. Shughart II, Walt Mayer, William 
Chappell and Robert Brown for their immense help and tremendous encouragement throughout 
this trying period. I am especially grateful to William F. Shughart who has read and corrected 
every single draft of this dissertation and for his unbridled commitment to see me through this 
stage in my life even to the extent of risking his life on more than one occasion. I'm eternally 
grateful. 
 Also deserving special mention is George Akpandjar for research assistance and much 
needed encouragement. Your constant encouragements and admonitions that "if anyone can do 
it, then it must be you" really picked me up during the lows of this whole process. At times, I felt 
I needed to come through with this, if for nothing, but to give you hope and to encourage you to 
look forward to it. 
 Last but not least, I thank Gökhan Karahan Conrad Puozaa, Mavuto Kalulu and Omotola 
Petgrave for immeasurable help in many ways than can be written here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................. v 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ x 
CHAPTER I .................................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKROUND ...................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Background of Timber Industry ............................................................................................ 7 
1.3 Economic Importance of Timber: Production, Consumption and Trade. ............................. 9 
1.4 Timber Industry in the South: Production and Use ............................................................. 12 
1.5 Exogenous Shocks: Effects of Natural Disasters/Hurricanes .............................................. 14 
1.7 U.S. – Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement ..................................................................... 15 
1.8 Summary .............................................................................................................................. 16 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL MODEL ............................................................................................................ 18 
2.1 Introduction and Theoretical Review of Spatial Market Integration ................................... 18 
2.2 Model: Spatial Pricing Behavior in Timber Markets .......................................................... 22 
2.2.1 F.O.B. Pricing................................................................................................................ 22 
2.2.2 Spatial Price Discrimination ......................................................................................... 31 
2.2.3 Basing Point Pricing ...................................................................................................... 34 
2.3 Empirical Implications ........................................................................................................ 37 
2.4 Summary .............................................................................................................................. 39 
CHAPTER III ............................................................................................................................... 41 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 41 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 41 
3.2 GMM Dynamic Time Series Model and Market Integration Tests ..................................... 44 
3.3 Validation: Market Integration Tests and Determinants of Integration .............................. 51 
vii 
 
3.4 Cointegration Tests of Spatial Price Relationships ............................................................. 55 
3.5. Summary ............................................................................................................................. 58 
CHAPTER IV ............................................................................................................................... 60 
DATA, RESULTS AND ANALYSES......................................................................................... 60 
4.1 Data ...................................................................................................................................... 60 
4.2 Results and Analysis ............................................................................................................ 63 
4.2.1 Pricing Behavior (Market Integration) Tests ................................................................ 63 
4.2.2 Determinants of Spatial Market Integration and Validation of Market Integration Tests
 ................................................................................................................................................ 66 
4.2.3 Cointegration Tests of Market Integration .................................................................... 71 
4.2.4 Comparison of Results: GMM Dynamic Time Series and Cointegration .................... 72 
4.3 Summary .............................................................................................................................. 73 
CHAPTER V ................................................................................................................................ 74 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 75 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 75 
5.2 Summary of Findings .......................................................................................................... 76 
5.3 Policy Implications .............................................................................................................. 79 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 80 
LIST OF APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 89 
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................... 90 
APPENDIX B: Price Discrimination Graphical illustration ......................................................... 92 
GLOSSARY OF TIMBER TERMS ........................................................................................... 118 
VITA ........................................................................................................................................... 122 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
PST  Pine Saw Timber 
PPW  Pine Pulpwood 
PCNS  Pine Chip and Saw 
F.O.B.  Free On Board 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
TPO  Timber Product Output 
BPP  Basing Point Pricing 
MFC  Marginal Factor Cost 
TMS  Timber Mart South 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1:Timber Volume, Growth and Removal by Species Group and Region 2007 ................. 10 
Table 2: Summary of Empirical Implications ............................................................................... 38 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Product Prices by State ............................................................... 61 
Table 4: Percentage Differences in Average Prices by Region .................................................... 62 
Table 5: Summary of Decision Rules on Pricing Behavior Tests ................................................ 64 
Table 6: Poisson GLM Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimates ................................................... 68 
Table 7: Gamma GLM Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimates .................................................. 69 
Table 8: Summary of Cointegration Results ................................................................................. 72 
Table 9: Comparison: Cointegrated and BPP Markets ................................................................. 73 
Table 10: Timber Imports and Exports Trends by Species and Major Trade Partners ................. 95 
Table 11: Timber Damage Volume (million ft3) and Dollar Impacts of Six U.S. Hurricanes ..... 96 
Table 12: ADF Unit Roots Tests .................................................................................................. 98 
Table 13: Mean Growth Rates of Prices by Period....................................................................... 99 
Table 14: Summary Statistics of Determinants of Market Integration and Others ..................... 100 
Table 15: CNS Pricing Behavior Tests ....................................................................................... 101 
Table 16: PPW Pricing Behavior Tests ...................................................................................... 105 
Table 17: PST Pricing Behavior Tests ........................................................................................ 110 
Table 18: Pine Chip and Saw Bivariate Cointegration Tests ...................................................... 115 
Table 19: Pine Pulpwood Bivariate Cointegration Tests ............................................................ 116 
Table 20: Pine Saw Timber Pricing Behavior Tests ................................................................... 117 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Oligopsony F.O.B. Pricing ............................................................................................ 23 
Figure 2: Oligopsony F.O.B. pricing: Comparative Statics .......................................................... 29 
Figure 3: Oligopsony Basing Point Pricing .................................................................................. 36 
Figure 4: Timber Mart South Price Regions ................................................................................. 60 
Figure 5: Spatial Price Discrimination .......................................................................................... 93 
 
          
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Evidence of price correlations or cointegrations in timber markets is often interpreted as 
indicative of the competitiveness and efficiency of these markets. This conclusion is based on the 
assumptions that firms price F.O.B.
1
 and F.O.B. pricing in spatial markets is expected to yield 
results analogous to the usual competitive results in spaceless competitive markets. This means 
that competitive arbitrage is assumed to be the mechanism through which spatial markets are 
linked. This conclusion could be misleading because we may observe price co-movements that 
are not consistent with competitive arbitrage yet wrongly interpreted as such by the methods we 
use. 
 In this dissertation, we model the economic impacts of oligopsony
2
 in the procurement of 
timber products in the presence of significant intra-regional transportation costs. We test our 
model on three forest products (Pine Saw Timber (PST), Pine Chip and Saw (CNS) and Pine 
Pulpwood (PPW))  for seven U.S. south-eastern and south-central states (two regions per state) 
using quarterly data from 1976 to 2009. These three products, because of the significant 
                                                          
1
 F.O.B. stands for Free on Board or Freight on Board, which is the price charged when a product is loaded onto a 
transportation vehicle, after which stage the buyer is responsible for paying the cost of shipping. 
2
 Oligopsony is a form of imperfect market competition characterized by a small number of buyers (but powerful) 
and a large number of sellers. Usually, oligopsony power exists in markets for primary products or intermediate 
inputs. The key characteristic of oligopsony is that the buyers recognize that their output and pricing decisions are 
interdependent. 
2 
differences in their prices, especially between PST and PPW, also allow us to verify other 
predictions of our model such as, higher valued products are expected to have more F.O.B. price 
relations than lesser valued products.  
 Specifically, we ask: 
 Are timber markets for three timber products (PST, PPW and CNS) integrated 
for 7 southeastern and southcentral states in the U.S? 
 What is the market structure and the pricing behavior that characterize the 
trajectory of observed prices in these products' markets? 
 Can price cointegrations or correlations be interpreted as indicative of the 
degree of competitive market integration for these three products? 
 In our empirical analysis, we find, consistent with our theory, that in the presence of 
significant intra-regional transportation costs between spatially dispersed markets, firms have an 
incentive to exploit their spatial market power. Competition between spatial markets decreases as 
distance between the markets increases. At the same time, non-competitive pricing behaviors 
such as price discrimination increase with increasing distance between markets. There is also 
evidence of some form of collusive basing point pricing for all three products, with about 13 to 
18 percent of markets for which the claim could not be rejected. We also find that between 55 to 
65 percent of markets that support some form of basing point pricing also are cointegrated. In 
addition, in line with our theoretical model, we find that higher valued products have more 
competitively integrated markets than lower valued products. This is because higher valued 
products offer more opportunities for arbitrage profits than lower valued products. 
 There are several novel contributions in this dissertation which extend the spatial market 
literature in general and that on the timber industry in particular. It represents the first study to 
3 
directly model and test the economic impacts of oligopsony in the procurement of forest products 
and for these geographic regions considered together. No study to our knowledge has focused on 
the south-east and south-central United States to ask the questions we intend to answer. This is 
especially so for CNS. These two regions represent by far the largest source of pine forest 
products in the United States. For instance, the states included in the study account for 75 percent 
of total southern timber output.
3
 
 We exploit, also, the richness of a multiproduct data set to draw more informed 
conclusions over and above that which would have pertained in a single product analysis. This 
allowed us to thresh out some possible inconsistencies or theoretical contradictions of 
conventional methods of determining spatial market integration in timber markets. 
 Finally, we use an updated data set covering periods when there were significant shocks 
to the market that could have affected its structure, conduct and performance over time. The last 
known study in this area used data ending in 1998. Since then, there have been many major 
market events in the sector. Examples of these shocks and changes include the U.S. – Canada 
Softwood Lumber Agreement of 2006, which started in 1982 as a dispute between the U.S. and 
Canada on subsidies for Canadian timber exports. Essentially, the dispute has manifested itself in 
limiting the amount of softwood lumber coming into the U.S. from Canada through a 
combination of trade restrictions in the form of trade quotas, tariffs and voluntary export 
restraints.
4
 Softwood lumber imports from Canada have averaged over 90 percent of total 
softwood lumber imports since 1990. So a trade restriction is likely to have a significant effect 
on the market. Another shock covered by the data set used is that of the period of the worst 
natural disasters experienced in the industry in history - four hurricanes (Frances, Ivan, Katrina 
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 PST, PPW and CNS are all softwood products. The study states are AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS and SC. 
4
 See Zhang  (2007) and Reed (2001) for a detailed chronology of events regarding this dispute. 
4 
and Rita) all making landfall between 2004 and 2005 and destroying close to 6000 million cubic 
feet of timber of which 60 percent was softwood. The damage to softwood as a percentage of 
total timber damage is as high as 76 percent in some states. On average, 91 percent of the total 
timber damage from these four hurricanes occurred within the seven states being analyzed in this 
study. A number of structural changes have occurred within the industry vis-a-vis concentration 
and capacity utilization. Between 1976 and 2009, the number of saw mills in the south decreased 
by about 32 percent (from 122 to 83) while the total capacity increased by 22 percent (from 
101,513 to 123,368 thousand cords) at the same time, thus indicating a higher degree of market 
concentration. This is even more pronounced in the study states, where the number of saw mills 
fell by 39 percent (98 to 60), while capacity increased by 28 percent (from 70,801 to 90,770 
thousand cords).  
 This dissertation has important implications for public policy regarding the recent 
consolidations among the buyers of such (forest) products for the fates of the industry's suppliers 
and for the welfare of the consumers of final products. The recent wave of antitrust cases brought 
against buyers in the industry makes the study all the more important. 
 A few studies have examined the question of timber market integration in the United 
States and beyond. Nagubadi, Munn and Alireza (2001) examined the question of timber market 
integration for hardwood pulpwood, mixed hardwood sawtimber and oak sawtimber in six 
southern states for the period 1977 to 1997 using both bivariate and multivariate cointegration 
techniques. They find that the six states cannot be classified as a single market on the basis of 
their multivariate analysis. However, bivariate results provide support for market integration of 
pairs of markets for each of the three products. Using these results, the authors concluded that 
there was evidence to support the existence of three separate markets for hardwood pulpwood 
5 
and two separate markets each for mixed hardwood and oak saw timber within the six-state 
region they examined. Using the same methodology, Niquidet and Manley (2008) assessed the 
extent of market integration of log prices for four regions in New Zealand using monthly price 
series from 1995 to 2006. They find evidence to support the hypothesis that export grades of logs 
displayed significant integration across regions and generally followed the law of one price. 
They, however, did not find evidence to support integration of domestic grades of logs that were 
supposed to be regionally segregated. Other studies using the same methodology to assess the 
extent of timber market integration include Daniels (2011), who used correlation analysis 
combined with cointegration analysis to examine the question of timber market integration for 62 
western U.S. national forests using quarterly stumpage prices from 1984 to 2007. The author 
finds that prices from the Beaverhead-Deerlodge and Salmon-Challis Forests and the Kootenai 
and Idaho Panhandle Forests are linked and then concludes that "only these two sets of forests 
can be modeled as integrated stumpage markets". David (2000)  tested the law of one price for 
five Canadian softwood lumber regional markets (Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies 
and British Columbia) using quarterly data for the 1981 - 1997 period. They too did not find 
evidence of a single market for the five-region market but had evidence to support bivariate 
integration of market pairs. 
 While the law of one price or cointegration of prices may hold as a statistical concept, 
acceptance of it is not sufficient to conclude that markets are integrated since prices can be 
cointegrated for reasons other than competitive arbitrage. This limits the application of 
cointegration analysis alone to test for market integration, especially in spatial markets with 
significant intra-regional transportation costs.  
 Bingham et al. (2003) recognized this limitation and applied both bivariate cointegration 
6 
analysis and multivariate regression analysis to re-examine the question of timber market 
integration for delivered southern pine logs and pine pulpwood in 21 Timber Mart South (TMS) 
price regions using quarterly price data from 1977 to 1998. They employed a two-step estimation 
procedure. The first step was to test for cointegration of price series between pairs of markets. 
They then ran a second-stage regression of the cointegration tests on factors that are 
hypothesized to influence timber market integration. They find that there was limited support for 
a single market for either product from their cointegration analysis for the whole market. 
However, a significant number of the markets were integrated in a bivariate sense. Based on 
these results and results from the second-stage regressions, they delineated the markets for the 
different products into integrated sub-markets.  
 While this approach is an improvement over the previous studies that relied only on 
correlations and cointegration analysis, it is still limited in a number of ways. First, by using the 
cointegration results to test factors determining market integration, the authors still assume that 
cointegrated markets are integrated markets. Therefore, factors that help explain a high degree of 
cointegration are interpreted as factors that explain market integration. However, other pricing 
schemes, such as collusive basing point pricing, which could yield the same cointegration results, 
will respond similarly to these hypothesized factors. As a result, the approach is still flawed in 
this respect. Secondly, the method is limited in that it does not allow for testing other spatial 
pricing schemes or behaviors.  
 The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: for the remainder of chapter I, 
we give a brief geographic and economic background for the timber industry. In Chapter II, we 
develop a theoretical model of timber procurement and pricing behaviors in spatial markets. 
Chapter III presents the empirical methods we employed to verify the predictions of our model 
7 
and to answer some other questions asked in this dissertation. We then present the data and 
results in Chapter IV. Chapter V concludes with policy implications of this study. 
 
1.2 Background of Timber Industry 
 
Around 1630, when the first European immigrants arrived in North America, total forest 
land was estimated to be 1,037 million acres (Clawson 1979), which was about 46 percent of the 
total land area. This area has declined steadily, with most of the post-settlement loss occurring in 
the north and southern regions of the United States. For instance, forests occupied 72 percent of 
total land area in the north in 1630, but by 1907, forests covered only 32 percent of that area 
(Kellog 1909), rebounding to the current level of 42 percent as of 2007. For the southern region, 
forest area dropped from 66 percent in 1630 to 46 percent in 1907 and then to 40 percent in 
2007. The total forest area of the United States today amounts to about 72 percent of the area it 
was in 1630. Clearing of forest land in the East between 1850 and 1900 averaged 13 square miles 
every day for 50 years; the period of greatest forest clearing in U.S. history.  Not surprisingly, 
this period coincides with one of the most prolific periods of U.S. immigration. Since 1900, U.S. 
forest area has remained statistically within 745 million acres, +/-5 percent, with the lowest point 
in 1920 of 735 million acres (i.e. shortly before the great depression).  U.S. forest area in 2000 
was about 749 million acres, which is about six (6) percent of the world’s forest area and the 
fourth largest forest estate of any nation, exceeded only by the Russian Federation, Brazil and 
Canada. 
For the last 100 years, forest cover has been relatively stable, following the period of 
heavy deforestation during the late 1800s. About 30 percent of the land is forested, and about 
two-thirds of the forests are classed as productive forests on which harvesting is not legally 
8 
prohibited. Out of the total U.S. forest area, about 7 percent is reserved for non-timber uses and 
managed by public agencies as parks, wilderness preserves or similar areas. Federal lands 
comprise about one-third of the country’s land area. The lobbying and advocacy activities of 
environmental groups resulted in a reduction in the contribution of U.S. federal lands to timber 
harvests to less than 6 percent, much less than 20 years ago. Private participation in forestry is 
high in the U.S. compared to most countries. Private lands supply 89 percent of the wood volume 
harvested in the United States.  
Forests in the United States have developed in response to both changing human 
demands and changing climatic conditions. The different climatic conditions in the United States 
have led to the classification of forests by regions. There are four main ecoclimatic zones in the 
United States, namely polar, temperate humid, arid and tropical humid (Bailey 1996). By 
Bailey’s classification, the south forest region5 is predominantly in a subtropical humid climatic 
zone except for pocket areas in Kentucky, Tennessee (temperate humid) and South Florida 
(tropical humid) (Smith, et al. 2009). Because of the general climatic conditions of this region, 
forest is the natural vegetation. The southern forests account for 30 percent of the unresereved 
forest area of the United States and 27 percent of all forest land as of 2007. Oak pine mixtures 
are common in the western and northern fringes of the southern forest. Loblolly-shortleaf pine 
forests are the most prevalent, covering about 25percent of southern forests  (Smith, et al. 2009). 
Most forests in the United States are of natural origin, with the southern region having the 
largest percentage of planted forests (20 percent compared to 8 percent nationally). The United 
States is estimated to have one trillion cubic feet of timber, of which approximately 57 percent is 
softwood. Softwood growing stock is concentrated in the west, with the Pacific Coast alone 
                                                          
5
 The states that make the southern region by this classification are: AL, AR, FL,GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, OK, 
TN, TX and VA. 
9 
accounting for 43 percent of the total and the south a little over 20 percent. When it comes to 
timber, the South is the largest timber producing region in the country, accounting for nearly 62 
percent of all harvested U.S. timber. While significant, harvesting affects less than 3 percent of 
the South’s forests annually. Timber harvesting impacts nearly 10 million acres in the United 
States per year, or about 1.3 percent of all forest land. But this rate is sustainable because of the 
increased number of planted forests. 
 
1.3 Economic Importance of Timber: Production, Consumption and Trade. 
 
According to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates, the contribution of 
forestry to U.S. GDP has declined from 1.6 percent in 1990 to 1.3 percent in 2000, even though 
the country is the world’s largest consumer and producer of forest products. Its share in world 
trade of forestry products is about 15 percent as of 2003. The value of solid wood shipments in 
2000 was US$94 billion; the value of pulp and paper shipments was US$166 billion; and 
furniture manufacturers contributed another US$20 billion. U.S. per capita consumption of forest 
products is high, twice that of other developed countries and four times the world average, but 
this average has been declining steadily. While wood consumption increased by about 50 percent 
between 1965 and 1999, per capita consumption of most of these products has been falling. 
Domestic forests supply much of the demand. In terms of employment, the forestry sector 
accounts for about 8.5 percent of all U.S. manufacturing jobs. 
Domestic production of industrial roundwood hovered around the 15,500 cubic feet mark 
between 1990 and 2005, until declining to 14493 cubic feet in 2008, - a 20 percent decrease 
between 1990 and 2008. The same story can be told of the softwood category of industrial 
roundwood production, which has averaged about 10100 cubic feet until 2008, when the figure 
10 
was about 8389 cubic feet - a 24 percent decrease. 
Table 1 displays percentages of total “Growing timber stock”, “Saw timber” and “Timber 
removals” accounted for by each region in the country for 2007.  
 
Table 1: Timber Volume, Growth and Removal by Species Group and Region 2007 
 
Region Growing stock Sawtimber Timber removals 
 
 
All 
Soft 
wood 
Hard 
wood All 
Soft 
wood 
Hard 
wood All 
Soft 
wood 
Hard 
wood 
 
North 27 11 48 26 11 46 18 7 38 
South 31 22 42 32 22 44 62 64 60 
Rocky 
Mount. 15 24 3 16 26 3 3 5 0 
Pacific 
Coast 28 43 7 26 42 6 16 24 2 
 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Computed from U.S. Forest Service, "RPA Assessment Tables," 2007 
 
Table 1 shows that the southern region has the largest growing stock of all species (31 
percent) and contributes about 62 percent to all timber removals in the country. When it comes to 
softwood, the Pacific Coast is dominant in growing stock (43 percent) and the South places third, 
yet the South contributes 64 percent to total softwood removals, compared to 24 percent from the 
Pacific Coast. In terms of hardwood, the north has the most growing stock (48 percent) and 
contributes 38 percent to hardwood timber removals, compared to the South which accounts for 
42 percent of hardwood growing stock and contributes 60 percent to total timber removals for 
the year in review. 
11 
On sawtimber, the south is the largest contributor for all species combined, accounting 
for 32 percent of the total. However, it is second to the North in hardwood, with 44 percent 
compared to the North’s 46 percent, and third (22 percent) in softwood after the Pacific Coast 
(42 percent) and Rocky Mountains (26 percent). The foregoing analysis indicates that trade 
intensity
6
 is higher in the south for all species combined as well as for both softwood and 
hardwood considered separately. 
Imports of industrial round wood have increased steadily, on average, peaking at 5805 
cubic feet in 2004, until declining to 3065 cubic feet in 2008. This represents a reduction of 
about 47 percent between the 2004 peak and 2008. Canada is the largest trading partner of the 
United States when it comes to timber imports. As can be seen from Table 10 (in appendix C), 
both lumber and log imports from Canada have averaged over 94 percent of total imports 
between 1990 and 2000 and 88 percent between 2001 and 2007. Lumber imports are largely 
made up of softwood species. The share of softwood lumber in total imports has averaged over 
97 percent between 1990 and 2007. For logs, the percentage of softwood in total log imports has 
increased steadily from 56 percent in 1990 to 91 percent by 2007. With the southern region 
contributing close to two-thirds of total softwood removals in the United States in 2007, it is the 
region that will tend to be affected the most by imports of softwood products and any policy 
changes that affect trade in softwood products. 
The United States does not export much of its timber products. Most of it is processed 
locally. Exports of industrial roundwood have decreased steadily from 2307 cubic feet in 1990 to 
1517 cubic feet in 2008, representing a 34 percent fall over that period. The lowest export figure 
occurred in 2007. Between 1990 and 1997, Japan was the largest importer of U.S. timber 
products. Exports to Japan of lumber constituted 30 percent of total U.S. exports, with Canada 
                                                          
6
 Trade intensity is defined to mean timber removals as a percentage of growing stock.  
12 
taking 20 percent between 1990 and 1997. However, in recent times, Canada has become the 
most important destination for U.S. lumber exports. Lumber exports to Canada have averaged 28 
percent between 1998 and 2003, before falling to 12 percent in 2004, and then rising back to the 
28 percent average. Japan’s share of U.S. lumber exports has fallen steadily, to 4 percent as of 
2008. 
In terms of logs, Japan has been the United States’ main trading partner, with an average 
share of 69 percent between 1990 and 2000, even though this share has fallen to 45 percent. Log 
exports to Canada have increased from 9 percent in 1990 to about 50 percent in 2007. Japan and 
Canada still account for over 90 percent of U.S. exports of logs. 
U.S. consumption of industrial roundwood increased on average from 16361 cubic feet in 
1990, to a peak of 19622 cubic feet in 2005, before decreasing steadily to 14041 cubic feet in 
2008. Much of this variation is explained by trends in the softwood category, which rose and fell, 
peaked and bottomed out in line with total industrial roundwood consumption. The changes in 
hardwood consumption are less dramatic. Per capita consumption of industrial roundwood rose 
by 64 cubic feet between 1990 and 2002 until falling steadily from 2003 to 2008 to an average of 
41cubic feet – a decline of about 37 percent from the previous average. This trend mirrors trends 
in the strength of the U.S. economy. 
 
1.4 Timber Industry in the South: Production and Use 
 
Industrial Timber Products Output (TPO) of roundwood for the Southern region 
decreased by 5 percent between 2005 and 2007.  This resulted from a decline in output of 
softwood roundwood products of 5 percent (or by 302 million cubic feet to 6.09 billion cubic 
feet), and a 7 percent decline in output of hardwood roundwood products (by 150 million cubic 
13 
feet to 2.13 billion cubic feet). In 2007, saw logs and pulpwood roundwood products alone 
accounted for 85 percent of the South’s total industrial roundwood output. 
Of the 13 southern states, Georgia led in total roundwood output with 1.25 billion cubic 
feet, followed by Alabama with 1.12 billion cubic feet. The two states combined accounted for 
28 percent of the South’s total production. Mississippi, Louisiana, and North Carolina followed 
with 908, 834, and 783 million cubic feet, respectively. Saw-logs account for about 42 percent of 
the South’s roundwood total output. However, saw-log production has seen a decline of 11 
percent between 2005 and 2007 (from 3.89 billion cubic feet in 2005 to 3.45 billion cubic in 
2007). Softwood saw-log output declined even more (by 13 percent to 2.52 billion cubic feet) 
Total receipts at southern mills, which included roundwood harvested and retained in the 
South and roundwood imported from other regions, declined by 5 percent to 8.26 billion cubic 
feet in 2007. The number of primary roundwood using plants in the South was down from 2,028 
in 2005 to 1,882 in 2007. Between 2005 and 2007, the number of sawmills in the South declined 
by 129 mills (from 1,669 sawmills to 1,540). This consolidation could be due to mergers (in 
which case processing capacity will not be affected much) or to business failures and plant 
closings. The total number of sawmills does not include a number of one-man sawmills in the 
Southern Region. Of the 1,540 sawmills operating, 429 were classified as softwood sawmills, 
1,009 were classified as hardwood sawmills, and the remaining 102 were classified as 
softwood/hardwood sawmills (Johnson, Bentley and Howell 2009). At the mills, total saw-log 
receipts dropped by 474 million cubic feet to 3.45 billion cubic feet. Softwood saw-log receipts 
declined 14 percent to 2.54 billion cubic feet; hardwood saw-log receipts were down from 996 to 
916 million cubic feet. Of the operating mills in 2007, 23 percent of them received 85 percent of 
total saw-log receipts in the region.  
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Pulpwood production, including chipped roundwood, accounted for 43 percent of the 
South’s roundwood TPO. Between 2005 and 2007, the total amount increased by 3 percent to 
3.55 billion cubic feet and softwood output was up 6 percent to 2.45 billion cubic. Hardwood 
output declined to 1.10 billion cubic feet, representing a 4 percent decrease. Georgia led the 13 
Southern states in total pulpwood production, with 611 million cubic feet. Alabama followed 
closely with 574 million cubic feet. These two states accounted for 33 percent of the Southern 
pulpwood production 
Eighty-seven pulpmill facilities were operating and receiving roundwood in the South in 
2007, the same as in 2005. Of the 87 pulpmills operating, 56 were classified as softwood 
pulpmills, 23 were classified as hardwood pulpmills, and the remaining nine were classified as 
softwood/ hardwood pulpmills. Total pulpwood receipts for these mills increased by 114 million 
cubic feet to 3.58 billion cubic feet, accounting for 43 percent of total receipts for all mills 
(Johnson, Bentley and Howell 2009). This goes to demonstrate the increased level of 
concentration in the industry within this time period. Thinking ahead, it should not be surprising 
that firms, with the increased market domination will engage in some non-competitive pricing 
behaviors. 
 
1.5 Exogenous Shocks: Effects of Natural Disasters/Hurricanes 
 
Natural disasters, especially hurricanes, have also had major effects on the timber 
industry. Table 11 (in appendix C) reports information on six severe hurricanes that made 
landfall in the United States over the past four decades. Between 1969 and 2005, there have been 
six major hurricanes which have affected six states the most. These states are all in the south 
(AL, SC, MS, FL, TX, and LA). Total estimated damage from these hurricanes is about 6000 
15 
million cubic feet, of which over 60 percent is softwood damage. Mississippi suffered the 
greatest total damage from all of these hurricanes, closely followed by South Carolina and 
Alabama. The damage to softwood as a percentage of total timber damage ranges between 53 
and 76 percent of the total. With the exception of Texas (which is not in the study sample), 
almost all of the states that were severely hit by these hurricanes are being examined in this 
dissertation. Even if Texas were included, except for Hurricane Rita, (2005), all other hurricanes 
had minimal to no effect on timber in that region.  
On average, 91 percent of the total timber damage from these six hurricanes occurred 
within the seven states being analyzed in this study.  
 
1.7 U.S. – Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement 
 
Trade agreements may affect the incentives available for international arbitrage in 
commodities. This in turn will affect the structure of the market being considered, especially if 
there is substantial trade between the countries in that commodity. The United States has entered 
into several trade agreements with some other nations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Others have been bilateral or 
multilateral, such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Canada-United 
States free trade agreement. One such agreement which directly affects the U.S. softwood timber 
industry is the U.S. – Canada Softwood lumber agreement. 
The United States and Canada have been in dispute for over two decades regarding 
bilateral trade in softwood lumber (Zhang 2007, Reed 2001). The U.S. claims that the Canadian 
lumber industry has been unfairly subsidized by the Canadian government. This claim stems 
from the fact that, in Canada, most timberland is publicly owned and stumpage prices are set 
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administratively by the government at levels less than competitive prices. In the United States, 
on the other hand, most timberlands are privately owned and stumpage prices are auctioned 
competitively. The United States claims that the provision of government timber at below market 
prices constitutes an unfair subsidy, but the Canadian government disputes this claim. Under 
U.S. trade remedy laws, foreign goods benefiting from subsidies can be subject to a 
countervailing duty tariff to offset the subsidy and bring the price of the product back up to 
market rates. 
Since 1982, there have been four major iterations of the dispute, the most recent 
agreement coming in 2006 after Canada refused to renew the 1996 agreement when it expired in 
2001. However, the basic thing running through all of the iterations is that they all have sought to 
limit the amount of softwood lumber that comes into the United States from Canada using 
various forms of trade instruments, such as import and export tariffs, quotas and even voluntary 
export restraints to offset the subsidies received. With trade limited between these two regions as 
a result of this dispute, it is natural for one to expect changes in the market and the behavior of 
firms therein. 
 
1.8 Summary 
This introductory chapter presents the research problem(s) of this dissertation. We 
showed how the current study extends the literature on industrial organization and that of spatial 
timber markets in particular. Specifically, the study represents the first to directly model 
oligopsony behavior in the procurement of timber products and tests it on three forest products. It 
is argued that, price co-movements alone do not give unequivocal results as to the structure, 
conduct and performance in spatial markets. We use an updated data set capturing several shocks 
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such as hurricanes, international trade agreements and consolidations that have directly affected 
the industry in this period. The last but not the least, we presented a brief overview of the timber 
industry in the United States and that of the South in particular. Forest area in the U.S. is now 
about 72 percent the area it was in 1630 and most forest lands are privately owned. The main 
trading partners with the U.S. in forest products are Canada, Japan and China. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
2.1 Introduction and Theoretical Review of Spatial Market Integration 
 
 Spatial price behaviors in commodity markets convey important information about 
market structure, conduct and performance. In well-functioning spaceless competitive markets, 
changes in prices accurately and quickly reflect changes in demand and supply conditions. 
However only when spatial markets are integrated competitively will changes in prices convey 
information about changes in market (demand and supply) conditions. If markets are not 
competitively integrated, the price system will convey inaccurate information that will distort 
producer and consumer decision-making, thus leading to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
 To motivate the theoretical analysis, we start with a conventional definition of market 
integration and assess its implications for spatial market integration. According to Tomek and 
Robinson (1981), if two regions trade with each other, then prices in the regions for the same 
product will differ only by transportation costs. If the regions do not trade the product with one 
another, then price differences should be less than or equal to transportation costs.
7
 If the price 
difference were greater than transportation cost, it would have elicited trade between the regions 
due to unexploited opportunities for arbitrage profits. Similarly, Goodwin and Schroeder (1991) 
say that if price changes in one market are fully reflected in alternative markets, then these 
                                                          
7
 Tomek and Robinson's evaluation of market integration is just another way of stating the law of one price, which 
says that in an efficient market, identical goods will sell at the same price net of transportation and transaction costs. 
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markets are said to be spatially integrated. Many past studies have adopted this definition and by 
extension the implicit assumptions that underlie it to test spatial market integration. 
The definition assumes that price co-movement or cointegration in spatial markets is due 
to competitive arbitrage (trade). But competitive arbitrage implies non-discriminatory pricing. 
This is so because with competitive arbitrage, the price of the product is determined in a region's 
central market and arbitrageurs take the price as given and move the product where they believe 
they can make profit after transport cost. According to Scherer and Ross (1990), in spatial 
markets, non-discriminatory pricing is consistent only with F.O.B. pricing.
8
 Therefore, according 
to the standard definition of market integration, F.O.B. pricing in spatial markets will yield 
results analogous to the usual familiar allocative efficiency results of spaceless competitive 
markets for a homogenous product differentiated only by location. In other words, firms price by 
equating price to marginal production cost plus actual transportation costs.  
 To get results in spatial markets that are analogous to the familiar allocative efficient 
results in spaceless competitive markets, the definition also implicitly presumes that all buyers 
and sellers are located at discrete points and that there are no intra-regional transportation costs 
(Takayama and Judge 1971). However, in the presence of significant intra-regional 
transportation costs, extending the results of the spaceless competitive market structure to 
geographically distinct markets may be mistaken because firms face a different profit-
maximizing calculus. In reality, spatial markets endow firms differentiated by their geographic 
locations with market power (Stigler, 1949). According to McChesney and Shughart (2007), for 
a firm to set price as equal to marginal cost at the mill plus transportation costs as suggested by 
the standard theory of F.O.B. may be inconsistent with rational-profit-maximization. McChesney 
                                                          
8
 Specifically, they say, F.O.B. pricing “is the only pricing scheme that entails no geographic price discrimination, 
since the price paid by the buyers increases in direct relation to the shipping costs, while the seller receives a 
uniform net price after freight expenses are covered” Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 502). 
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and Shughart (2007) also noted that “… even if spatially dispersed firms price F.O.B. as the 
accepted theory suggests, … the prices that spatially dispersed, profit-maximizing firms actually 
charge might well be influenced by the potential competition each faces at the market boundary." 
This is especially true for bulky products like timber whose value relative to the cost of 
transportation is low. With high transportation costs relative to product value, the extent of 
spatial market integration as suggested by the standard definition of integration will be limited by 
distance (Murray & Wear 1998; Mulligan & Fik 1988). This means that the application of 
classical competitive theory to explain price integration in imperfect markets (such as spatial 
markets) may not square with the holy grail of profit maximization in economics and the realities 
of the business world.  
 Even though F.O.B. pricing (as suggested by the standard definition of integration), is a 
possible explanation for market integration and the most efficient pricing scheme in spatial 
markets,
9
 it may not be the only reason underlying price comovements in spatial markets, 
especially given that firms may want to exploit their spatial market power. 
 An alternative explanation for spatial price cointegration therefore follows from the 
oligopolistic or collusive behavior of firms. Oligopolies or oligopsonies may, through explicit or 
tacit collusion, compete only within some defined geographic areas (Faminow & Benson 1990). 
Firms may adopt a limit-entry pricing scheme whereby each firm quotes a price to customers 
based on the price it thinks its nearest rival will charge given the rival’s cost of shipping the 
product to the customer. Limit-entry pricing is consistent with a basing-point pricing system – a 
type of delivered pricing system in which price quotes are calculated using geographic locations 
                                                          
9
 It is efficient because F.O.B. pricing assumes that the markets clear or the prices move together because of 
arbitrage. Therefore, the product is moved from the low price (less valued area) to the high price (more valued area). 
Integration due to F.O.B. is integration emanating from arbitrage and thus involves physical movement of the 
product between markets. 
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other than the commodity’s actual point of manufacture (Shughart 1997). For example, in an 
analysis of school milk procurement data for Ohio, Porta & Zona (1999) found that some firms 
colluded to artificially raise bids for defined territorial areas leading to a 6.5% increase in prices. 
The nature of basing-point pricing allows prices in all markets to be perfectly linked (in the case 
of complete basing point or perfect basing point pricing), thus, suggesting that in line with the 
standard theory the market structure is competitively integrated, when actually it may not.
10
 
 Limit-entry pricing may, under some plausible conditions, be pro-competitive. One case 
in point is where firms discriminate to capture customers instead of to collude against them. In 
other words, if firms compete only for customers further away and into the territory of another 
by absorbing frieght charges, i.e., charge prices to distant customers lower than the prices 
charged to nearer customers - a form of discrimination, then limit entry pricing may be pro-
competitive.  
 In general, products with high value relative to transportation costs will be expected to 
lend themselves more to arbitrage and F.O.B. than products with low value relative to 
transportation costs, especially if we observe high price volatility between regions. This is so 
because for high-value products, more opportunities for profitable arbitrage emerge with price 
changes. For example, assume that gold and timber are two products traded between Mississippi 
and Virginia. Also assume that the cost of transporting the two goods between regions is the 
same. If the price of gold is a lot higher than the price of timber, then a 1 percent increase in the 
prices of both gold and timber in, say, Mississippi will cause more gold to be moved from 
Virginia to Mississippi than we will observe of timber moving from Virginia to Mississippi.  In 
fact timber may not be moved at all if the price change does not exceed the cost of 
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 Integration due to basing point pricing does not involve physical product movement. This implies that observed  
price co-movements in the system are not reflective of underlying market conditions. 
22 
transportation. In this case, observed price co-movements in timber may be explained by other 
forms of pricing schemes, such as collusive basing point pricing. 
 
2.2 Model: Spatial Pricing Behavior in Timber Markets 
 
 In what follows, we extend the analyses thus far on spatial market structure within an 
oligopoly setting to the case of oligopsony with a model assuming significant intraregional 
transportation costs, as is the case with most timber products. The spatial pricing models 
considered are F.O.B. pricing, price discrimination and basing point pricing (BPP).  
 
2.2.1 F.O.B. Pricing 
 
 Mill (F.O.B.) pricing within an oligopsony setting  dictates that each buying firm offers a 
mill price PT, at the factory gate/buying site and sellers are responsible for paying shipping costs 
from their specific locations to the buyer's mill. If the buyer is to be responsible for shipping 
costs, then sellers will receive the mill price less actual shipping costs from seller’s site to 
buyer’s site. The implication is that a seller nearer the factory gate receives a higher net price 
than a seller further away from the factory gate, assuming identical cost structures (both 
transportation and processing). 
 In this chapter, we follow the lead of Faminow and Benson (1990) and develop an 
oligopsony model of pricing behavior in spatial markets. To do this, we make several 
assumptions about the nature of the supply function facing buyers and the production technology 
by which inputs are converted into finished goods. The critical and distinguishing assumption of 
Faminow and Benson's oligopoly model is that intraregional transportation costs are significant. 
According to them, previous studies assumed away intraregional transportation costs when 
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examining spatial market integration (competition). Since the timber industry is more likely to 
lend itself to significant intraregional transportation costs owing to the bulkiness of the product, 
we find their specification quite appropriate for the present analysis.  
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Figure 1: Oligopsony F.O.B. Pricing 
 
 Assume that there are three spatially distributed firms X, Y and Z that buy and process 
timber. Timber sellers are located uniformly and continuously over the linear distance D as 
shown in Figure 1., where PTx, PTy and PTz  are mill prices offered by firms X, Y and Z and  u is 
transportation cost measured in units per distance.  A seller will ship timber to whatever buyer 
offers a higher purchase price net of transportation costs. Given constant transportation costs per 
unit distance and identical production functions for the buyers, the seller will ship its product(s) 
to the closest buyer under a system of F.O.B. pricing because that is what going to give the seller 
the highest price net of transportation (assuming that the seller is responsible for the cost of 
transportation). 
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 However, for our analysis, we do not assume that the buying firms have identical cost 
structures. This means that the seller does not necessarily ship to the closest buyer. In this way, 
we allow some firms to enjoy larger market shares either because of cost advantages or 
locational advantages. For instance, in Figure 1, firms X and Y have identical marginal costs and 
they have lower costs of production than firm Z.
11
 As a result firms X and Y offer higher mill 
prices to their sellers than firm Z offers. This means that timber sellers on the horizon YZ (D 
minus Y) do not necessarily sell to the closest firm but rather to the firm that offers a higher net 
price. A seller close to Z may for example, offer to sell to Y if the cost of shipping to Y is less 
than the price difference between PTY and PTZ.  
 In terms of location, firm Y has an advantage over firms X and Z because it is located at 
the center of the uniformly distributed supplier stream.
12
 Firm Y can be a market leader based on 
its costs and service area – the service area being a proxy for size.  
 Further assume for the current analysis that timber processing firms (buyers) are 
competitors in the output (finished product) market and thus take the price of the finished 
product (P) as given. This assumption simplifies the analysis and enables us to focus on the input 
market and its price dynamics. Even though this second assumption is a simplifying one, in the 
case of timber products it is also realistic because the final good market can be said to be at least 
national if not international in scope and served by many different firms. In that sense, the firms 
are more likely to be price takers in the final product market. This is particularly true for high 
valued products relative to transportation costs because a small percentage change in product 
value translates into higher absolute values thus eliciting arbitrage activity. 
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 This is depicted by the different vertical intercepts for their respective net price schedules (PTi - u). Buyers X and 
Y are able to offer higher prices because they have lower production costs. 
12
 This locational advantage holds only if sellers are uniformly distributed along D with the market space bounded to 
the left of X and the right of Z. 
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General form of model 
 Let sellers have an identical input supply function of the form 
 ,Ti Ti Tiq u P P  (1) 
where  TiP = the F.O.B. mill price of timber offered by firm i,  ,T T TiP P u P  is the price of timber 
received by the seller after netting transportation costs from the mill price, and   is as defined 
earlier. The aggregate supply facing firm i over its economic (market) space will be 
,( )
l
Ti Ti Ti
k
Q q P u du 
                                  (2)
 
with the limits of integration,          representing the boundaries of the firm and its competitors. 
A firm, i (buyer of timber), converts the timber inputs (     into finished product (Qi) by the 
following fixed-proportions production technology 
 
( )
 , , Ti Tii i
Q P
Q min k M F

 
  
   (3)
 
and with cost function, 
 ( ) ,. ( ) ( )i Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti iC Q P Q P c Q P F    (4) 
 
where M = vector of all processing inputs other than timber, F = fixed costs,    the fixed 
conversion factor between the raw timber input and the finished product and  (     
 processing cost of inputs associated with input vector M. 
 Let         be the only two firms in the market and D be the distance between them. The 
market boundary, say   , between these two firms will be defined by  
 
  ( , ) ( , ( ))Ti Ti i Tj Tj iP G P DP P G   (5) 
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 The profit function for firm   will be given by   
 
  . ( ) . ( ) ( )i i Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti iP Q P P Q P c Q P F      
 
where P = price of the finished good. 
 If we assume that     in equation (3), and  ( )Ti Ti Tic Q P cQ , in (4) then 
                                                   (3') 
and
13
 
 
( ) . ( )i Ti Ti Ti Ti iC Q P Q P cQ F   . (4') 
 
 Substituting (        (    into the profit function and maximizing with respect to     , 
we have 
 
 
  ' . ( )Ti Ti Ti TiP c P P Q P   .                           (6)  
 
The left-hand side of equation (6) is the marginal revenue product (MRP) of employing 
additional timber and the right-hand side is the marginal factor cost (MFC) of an additional unit 
of timber.
14
 Since     is evaluated over market boundaries (distance), then the price that the firm 
pays to sellers will be a function of these boundaries. Larger market boundaries imply the firm 
servicing a wider geographic area. This is similar to saying the limits of the markets are wide, 
thus, sellers further away to the limit will receive much lower net prices under an F.O.B. pricing 
scheme. 
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 Equation (3’) depicts a constant returns to scale production function such that every unit of the input      yields 
one unit of the output Qi = QTi 
14
 The marginal factor cost has two components: PTi is the price paid to the input supplier and P'Ti.QTi is the 
additional cost incurred on all quantities that were previously being purchased as a result of the change in input 
prices due to the change in the amount of the input now being employed. 
i TiQ Q
27 
Illustrative Example 
 Assume the following specific timber supply function facing the firm at each selling 
point in the market 
 v
Ti Ti
b
P q
v
 , (7) 
where  
 Ti TiP P u   
and        ̅   and     are as defined earlier;          are positive parameters.
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 Substituting  Ti TiP P u   into (7) and solving for    , we have 
 1/( ) vTi Ti
v
q P u
b
   (8) 
Given equation (  , the market supply of timber facing buyer   is given by 
  
1
1/
( )
1
l
v
vl
v
Ti Ti Ti
k
k
v b v
Q P u du P u
b v b
 
    
             
 . (9) 
When    , as in Figure 1, 
    
1 1
1
v v
v v
TX TX TX
b v v
Q P P G
v b b
  
    
            
 (10) 
 The profit function and first-order condition for firm X are given below 
      
1 1
  
1
v v
v v
X TX TX TX i
b v v
P P P P G F
v b b

   
                      
 (11) 
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 Theoretically, v can be negative but it will imply a negatively sloped (backward bending) supply curve.  
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 The term 
  
    
 characterizes oligopsonistic interdependence. To be able to solve (12), we need to 
find the boundary conjecture for  
TX
dG
X
dP
 . Consider locations between X and Y. The boundary 
G is defined by the equalization of net prices offered to sellers. This means from Figure 1 that  
 TX X TY YP u P u   at G, (13) 
where  
 ,and X Yu G u D G     (14) 
Therefore, 
 ( )TX TYP G P D G     
 Solving for G from (14) and differentiating with respect to price, we have 
 
1
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2
TY
TX TX
dPdG
dP dP
 
  
 
. (15) 
 The boundary conjecture 
TX
dG
dP
 is thus dependent on X’s expectations of Y’s reaction to 
changes in the price X offers to sellers. Therefore, the price set by X depends on the parameters 
of the model, its own boundary and the global boundary condition. Formally, we can write firm 
X’s price reaction function as 
 ( , , , , )TX
TX
dG
P b v mfc G
dP
  (16) 
 
 By assuming specific parameter values, we will be able to solve (16). We can derive 
results for firms Y and Z similarly (see appendix A). 
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Comparative Statics 
 A change in the price X offers to its sellers will most likely ripple through the whole 
market as firms Y and Z respond according to their reaction functions given by (22) and (23) 
(see appendix A). See Figure 2, for instance. If firm X increases its price to P'TX  (for any reason 
ranging from lower processing costs to other supply or demand shocks),  it will cause firm X's 
market area to expand from G to G' and Y's market area to shrink by G' - G. Firm Y, noticing 
this, may react to firm X's price increase by increasing its price, too. 
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Figure 2: Oligopsony F.O.B. pricing: Comparative Statics 
 Figure 2 is drawn in such a way that firm Y matches X's price increase in order to 
recapture its lost market area. As firm Y tries to recapture its lost suppliers by increasing PTY, it 
expands its market space by H' - H at the expense of Z. Firm Z may also respond by increasing 
price. This process may lead to further reactions from X, Y and Z and the full adjustment may 
take time to reach a new equilibrium. This means that irrespective of the cause of the initial price 
increase by X, prices in all the other markets tend to be affected by it. This puts X, Y and Z in 
the same market. However, it may be the case that firm Y does not match the increase in X's 
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price. It could offer to pay either  less or more, bearing in mind that whatever action it takes will 
prompt firm Z to react.  
 The cost to reacting and reclaiming one's lost market area under oligopsony is the 
increased expenditure on inputs in the previously lost market area and any other market area that 
was controlled by the firm but not affected by X's initial actions. For instance, if Y does match 
X's price, it increases expenditure on its inputs in line with the increase in price not only in the 
market space it shares with X but also in the market space it shares with Z (assuming that Z 
matches Y's price). So, if firm Y realizes that the increased cost of reclaiming the lost market 
area is greater than the benefit in terms of the value of reduced output resulting from the 
purchase of fewer inputs, it may react less or not react at all, thus acting as a buffer between 
itself and the next firm, Z. The larger the number of intermediate buying firms between two 
buying sites, the weaker will be the price reactionary effects because some firms may respond to 
a lesser degree, thus moderating the initial price effect. It is also worth noting that even after the 
adjustment is fully complete, the net prices need not be equal across space or differ exactly by 
transportation costs despite the interdependence of the prices in the different markets. Arbitrage 
guarantees only that prices do not differ by more than transportation costs but, indeed, can differ 
by less than transportation costs (Tomek and Robinson 1981). 
 Empirically, if the predictions of competitive F.O.B. hold, price changes in, say, region X 
will net out and exactly match price changes in the other regions in a dynamic fashion in the long 
run. But as explained earlier, because of market power, firms in economic space have reason to 
behave differently from what is expected of them under F.O.B. pricing. We next consider spatial 
price discrimination as a possible explanation for observed prices in timber markets. 
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2.2.2 Spatial Price Discrimination 
 
 For a firm to be able to price discriminate in an oligopsony setting, it must have market 
power, be able to segregate its supplier base into submarkets corresponding to supply elasticities 
and be able to prevent arbitrage. Spatial markets by their very nature offer firms some degree of 
market power within their geographical territories. This allows them to discriminate based on the 
locations of their suppliers
16
 and, under some conditions, to make arbitrage unprofitable. This 
ability to discriminate is even more evident in markets for bulky products like timber, as 
observed by Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 504) - "When producers are located at different points 
on a map, their products are said to be spatially differentiated. When in addition transport costs 
are significant in relation to total product value, as in steel, cement ... and many other 
commodities, pricing practices often entail significant elements of discrimination". 
 Following from our work on F.O.B. pricing above, we will consider a simple model of 
oligopsonistic price discrimination. A spatial oligopsonist that wants to discriminate will set 
price ( 
u
TP ) for a seller located at distance   from its factory gate by equating the marginal 
revenue product (MRP) to the marginal factor cost (MFC) at that point. By replacing     with 
u
TP  
in (6) and then rearranging, we have  
  
1
1uT s
T
P c P

 
   
 
, (24) 
where  ' .  
u
s u T
T T T
T
Q
P
P
Q
   input supply price elasticity. Now rewrite equation (7) as (i.e., replace 
 ̅   with 
u
TP ) 
 u v
T T
b
P Q
v
                (7') 
 
and then differentiate with respect to     This gives  
                                                          
16
 We assume that the firm knows the locations of all its suppliers. 
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  1 )'(
u
T T u v
T T T
T
Pd Q
P Q bQ
dQ
   
We can then write   
  as,  
 
1 1
1.
( )
v v u
s v T T T
T T u u u
T T T
Q bQ
bQ
P v
P
P P

 
        
   
. (25) 
 Substituting (25) into (24) and simplifying the right-hand side yields 
 
   (1 )  (1 )u uT TP c v P P Pc v         (26) 
 
 For sellers located at distance   from the factory gate, a portion of transportation cost will 
be subtracted from marginal factor costs or added to marginal revenue product in the case of 
discrimination. Therefore, 
 
 (1 )
u
TFPP c v u     (27) 
 
where 
u
TFP  = the final (net price) received by sellers of timber and   is the fraction of 
transportation cost subtracted from the MFC. Theoretically,   can take any value but practically 
should be between 0 and 1. 
 Solving (27) for 
u
TFP , gives us 
 
 
 
1 1
1 (1 )
u
TF P c u
v v
P   
 
. (28) 
 
The value that v (a parameter of the model) takes determines whether a firm can price 
discriminate and whether or not it is profitable to do so. 
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Comparative Statics and Analysis 
 The first term in equation (28) is the price offered at the factory gate, as can be seen from 
(26).  From (28), the slope of the net price received by sellers of timber as the distance between 
the seller and the buyer varies is 
  
(1 )
u
TFdP
du v

 
  
 The larger the slope (in terms of absolute steepness), the lower will be the price paid to a 
seller as the distance increases between seller and buyer. Obviously, the sign and magnitude 
depend on what value we assume for v. In the F.O.B. case, because of the assumption of unit 
transport costs, the slope of the net price schedule with respect to u is –1. This means that  
            with F.O.B. pricing. A discriminatory price schedule with slope less than – 1 
implies that the buying firms are undercutting transportation costs to distant sellers, i.e., 
absorbing freight.
17
 In other words, the firm is discriminating in favor of distant sellers or against 
closer sellers. This will hold true for any value of    .18 Conversely, when the slope of the 
discriminatory price schedule is greater than –1, this implies “phantom freight”, meaning that the 
firm is discriminating against distant sellers and in favor of the closer sellers. This will be true 
for values of v that lie between        .19 
 With freight absorption,
20
 arbitrage is not profitable because buyers will be able to offer 
distant sellers the best possible price. However, in the case of phantom freight, arbitrage will 
                                                          
17
 The statement “a discriminatory price schedule with slope less than -1” is used to mean a smaller negative value 
for the slope and not the absolute value of it.  
18
 Another theoretical possibility leading to freight absorption will be the case where the value of v < -2 (in integer 
terms). In this case the discriminatory price schedule will be positive in slope. Intuitively, what this means is that the 
firm will absorb more than the actual amount of freight. This does not make economic sense because the firm would 
maximize profits by equating MRP to MFC at its base. 
19
 If      (i.e., more negative) the slope of the discriminatory price schedule will be positive meaning that the 
firm pays distant sellers prices higher than the case when transport costs equal zero. That is counterintuitive. 
20
 Freight absorption under oligopsony is the situation where the buyer pays part or all of the cost of transportation. 
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make it impossible for the buyer to profit from that policy and thus prevent discrimination in 
favor of nearer sellers. As a result, the theoretical analysis of price discrimination is based on the 
assumption that    . When    , since the firm will be prevented from discriminating in 
favor of nearby sellers, the best the firm can do will be to price F.O.B. Therefore, given the 
theoretical restrictions, discriminatory pricing with     will produce lower price intercepts and 
flatter delivered price schedules than F.O.B. pricing, as depicted in Figure 5 (Appendix B). The 
boundaries of the market will then be at the point where the delivered prices are equal because 
sellers will sell to the buyer offering the highest net price.  
 Given the independence of the price-setting behavior by buyers, interactions 
(interdependence) will occur only at the boundaries where the net prices are equal. With 
discrimination, firms can penetrate the "natural" markets of their competitors beyond the 
boundaries where their price schedules otherwise would meet. It is in this sense that 
“discrimination may break the linkage that implies extensive market integration, as under F.O.B. 
pricing” (Faminiow and Benson 1990, p. 54). 
 
 2.2.3 Basing Point Pricing 
 
 Within the context of an oligopsony, basing point pricing (BPP) is a pricing scheme in 
which the price quoted for any seller equals a base (mill) price set at a particular site minus the 
transportation costs from that site to the seller. In other words, if by common consent one point is 
chosen as the base, then the BPP will be the announced base price minus the cost of transporting 
the good from the seller's site to the base point irrespective of the proximity of the actual point of 
sale to the firm (buyer).  
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 In Figure 3, X is the chosen base in a three-firm market. Firm X can buy all the way to Z 
using the adopted price schedule TXP  u . All other firms in the market (Y and Z) will adopt the 
price schedule announced by X. At their respective bases, Y and Z price as if they were located 
at X using X's price schedule. Therefore, prices net of transportation costs are the same across 
regions. This means that firms Y and Z offer sellers a lower price at their locations than they 
otherwise would have offered under a system of F.O.B. by over-charging them for shipping 
costs. Firms Y and Z can buy to the left of their locations either because they have lower 
production costs or because they want to cheat on a tacit or explicit price agreement, but 
purchases to the left of their locations will demand freight absorption. If Z buys all the way to X, 
for instance, it would have absorbed freight equaling the sum of the areas A, B and C; for Y the 
total amount of freight absorbed when it buys all the way to X will be, the area, "A" as in Figure 
3.
21
 Sales to the right of the locations of Y and Z will demand absorbing "phantom freight" since 
buyers normally will pay a price higher than the price at the mill less unit transportation costs. 
But as a result of BPP, they pay an artificially lower price. 
 The adopted basing point price (BPP) schedule (PTX - u) will change only when a 
different basing point is chosen or only when the announced basing point price changes. In either 
case, the change will be transmitted uniformly and instantaneously throughout the market. 
Changes in the prices of other regions (be they due to demand or cost reasons) will not affect the 
BPP. This means that price changes can be one-directional only under BPP. In the sense that 
price changes at the base are uniformly transmitted throughout the market, then one will expect a 
higher degree of price integration in markets where BPP is used than in markets where F.O.B. is 
the pricing scheme.  
                                                          
21
 Firms will not have an incentive to buy to the left of Y under BPP if the input is characterized by constant costs. 
In other words, no actual shortages at the prevailing price. 
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Figure 3: Oligopsony Basing Point Pricing 
 Basing point pricing is usually the result of some oligopoly or, for that matter, oligopsony 
arrangement or some form of price leadership (Scherer & Ross 1990). It typically is adopted by 
oligopolists (oligopsonists) when the product concerned is homogenous , with high 
transportation costs relative to the value of the product and where marginal production costs are 
low (at less than capacity operation) relative to total unit cost (Nin 2001).   
 These conditions for BPP fit well the timber industry, too, thus suggesting the possibility 
of a BPP regime in describing pricing behaviors. Lower valued timber products with high 
transportation costs are expected to exhibit more instances of BPP. Since an effective BPP 
requires considerable cooperation, the effectiveness of the system varies inversely with the 
number of independent buyers in a properly defined market.  A single-firm multi-plant BPP 
system is likely to be more effective than a multi-firm (independent) BPP system since there will 
be incentives to cheat in the latter. Empirically, therefore, one will expect basing point pricing 
where one buyer (firm) is dominant in the different trading regions. 
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2.3 Empirical Implications 
 
 In  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2, we summarize some of the empirical relations or regularities we expect given the 
models presented. In general, markets characterized by F.O.B. are less integrated than those 
characterized by BPP. Also, we are more likely to observe F.O.B. pricing in markets where the 
value of the product is high relative to the cost of shipping it than in markets where the reverse is 
true. Price intercepts (price at the base) in F.O.B. markets are higher than those observed in 
markets characterized by price discrimination. Finally, distance between markets reduces price 
relationships between F.O.B. pricing regions while distance has no effect on price relationships 
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under basing point pricing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of Empirical Implications 
 
ISSUE F.O.B. BPP Discrimination 
 
Degree and Extent of 
Price Integration 
Markets will be less 
integrated than under 
BPP 
Markets more integrated 
than under F.O.B. 
Prices will be 
independent of other 
markets 
    
Pattern and Direction of 
price interactions 
The price interactions 
between markets will 
not have a defined 
pattern. 
Price interactions 
between markets have a 
clear pattern - from the 
basing point to the other 
markets 
No Pattern 
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Time Span for Price 
Adjustments 
Price adjustments 
should be weaker in the 
short-run under a 
system of F.O.B. This 
means that there will be 
lagged effects in the 
long run. 
Price adjustments are 
instantaneous and 
observed within a very 
short period of time. 
Thus no lagged effects 
observed in price 
adjustments 
Prices hardly adjust if 
not for a common cause 
    
Distance between 
markets and degree of 
integration 
The longer the distance, 
the smaller will be the 
degree of market 
integration. 
Distance has no effect 
on the degree of 
integration - prices are 
announced & adopted. 
Distance should have a 
positive significant 
effect on the degree of 
discrimination 
    
Product value and 
Market Integration 
For higher valued 
products, F.O.B. is 
likely to be reason 
behind price co-
movements between 
regions 
For lower valued 
products, significant 
price co-movements are 
likely to be explained by 
BPP 
A priori, an effective 
discriminatory scheme 
should not depend on 
the value of product 
    
Market Concentration 
and Market Structure 
We expect more F.O.B. 
for markets with low 
concentration indexes. 
We expect more BPP 
for markets with high 
concentration indexes. 
More discrimination in 
highly concentrated 
markets 
    
Price at Mill The mill price offered at 
the factory gate should 
be higher than that 
offered at the factory 
gate under 
discriminatory pricing 
The base price should 
equal the mill price 
under F.O.B. but lower 
for other firms at factory 
gate. 
Lower prices offered at 
mill than under F.O.B. 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
 In this chapter, we developed the theory of spatial pricing behavior in timber markets 
assuming that transportation costs are significant relative to product value. We considered three 
main spatial pricing schemes - F.O.B. pricing, Price Discrimination and Basing Point Pricing. 
We showed that F.O.B. pricing, which is consistent with actual spatial market integration (within 
the context of competition) tended to fall as the distance between spatial markets increase. This 
is so because opportunities for arbitrage profits decline as distance increases and arbitrage is 
assumed to be the error correction mechanism under F.O.B. pricing. Not surprising, price 
discrimination on the other hand increase with increasing distance between the markets. This 
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goes to show firms in spatial settings are endowed with market power and this power will 
increase the further away they are from a competitor. Finally, basing point pricing (in the strict 
form of the concept) even though exhibited price behaviors similar to that of F.O.B., did not 
change as distance between markets change. This goes to confirm that it is possible to have price 
co-movements that are not consistent with competitive pricing or market integration. 
 In the next chapter, we test empirically, the predictions of our theory on three timber 
products for seven U.S. southeastern and southcentral states. 
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CHAPTER III  
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, we present the estimation strategies we employ to answer 
the following research questions:  
 Are timber markets for three timber products (PST, PPW and CNS) integrated 
for seven southeastern and southcentral states in the U.S? 
 What is the market structure and the pricing behavior that characterize the 
trajectory of observed prices in these products' markets? 
 Can price cointegration or correlations be interpreted to be indicative of the 
degree of competitive market integration for these three products?". 
Before outlining our empirical approach, we briefly review approaches of past studies. 
 
Review of Previous Studies' Methods 
 Empirical investigation of market integration has taken various forms depending on the 
availability of data. Some studies that have access to data on transportation costs have sought to 
determine the extent of market integration by testing whether price differences equal 
transportation costs, as hypothesized by Tomek and Robsinson (1981).
22
 Pioneering studies 
                                                          
22
 Alternatively, prices could be compared to what will pertain under competitive conditions in spaceless markets. 
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using this approach include Stout & Feltner (1962) and Hays & McCoy (1977). The problem for 
scholars following the pioneers' trail is that it is very difficult to get data on transportation costs 
for most products. Data on transportation costs, even if available, are likely to be poor. Also, this 
approach gives an "either-or" answer to the question of integration. Markets are either integrated 
or not. However, there is a grey area between the two. Markets can be integrated by BPP or the 
price formation process could be characterized by discrimination. 
 Other studies have used bivariate correlations between price series to predict market 
integration. The economic justification for doing so, as noted by Monke & Petzel (1984), is that 
if two markets trade with each other, then price changes in one market should lead to identical 
price changes in the other, irrespective of the cause of the initial price change. In other words, the 
hypothesis of Monke and Petzel is that markets are said to be integrated if the prices of products 
differentiated in space do not behave independently. A large correlation coefficient is taken to 
imply that markets are integrated. Examples of studies using this approach include: Jones (1968), 
Blyn (1973), Harriss (1979), Stigler & Sherwin (1985), Uri & Rifkin (1985), Neal (1987) and 
Daniels (2011). The problem with this approach is that it does not reveal the underlying 
mechanism by which prices are correlated. Price correlations can be consistent with other forms 
of market structures, as discussed in previous chapters. Also, if the time series properties of the 
data are not accounted for, the observed price correlations could be spurious. 
 Recent studies in the area of market integration have employed cointegration analysis, 
which takes into account the time series properties of the data. There are quite a number of 
studies using this approach, examples of which include Goodwin and Schroeder (1990), Nanang 
(2000), Nagubadi et al. (2001), Bingham et al. (2003), Kainulainen & Toppinen (2006), Niquidet 
& Manley (2008) and Daniels (2011). Markets that are found to be cointegrated usually are 
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presumed to be integrated. This means that by using cointegration analysis to test market 
integration, it is implicitly assumed that F.O.B. pricing is the benchmark since that is the form of 
price integration that is consistent with actual market integration in spatial markets - where 
arbitrage is the error correction mechanism. 
 There are a few problems with relying solely on cointegration tests to accept or reject 
spatial market integration. First, while cointegration may be able to tell whether prices in two 
regions are linked, it is not very flexible for identifying the underlying mechanism for the 
observed price linkages. This means that some price co-movements, such as collusive basing 
point pricing not due to competitive arbitrage but which have been around for a long time, will 
be captured by cointegration as indicative of the competitiveness of markets.  
 Secondly, the concept of cointegration is not an absolute finding but actually can change 
with structural innovations (breaks) in market conditions. This means that the cointegration 
relation could have been affected by other reasons, such as technological innovations, 
macroeconomic fluctuations, demand or supply shocks and policy regime changes, especially if 
the sample covers a long period of time. Structural breaks make the use of cointegration analysis 
over long sample periods problematic. 
 In addition, as pointed out earlier, while cointegration will tell us if there is a long term 
price co-movement, it does not have the flexibility to test other pricing schemes; some of which 
could be consistent with long term price co-movements (such as a stable basing point pricing 
system) and others consistent with other pricing schemes consistent with spatial profit 
maximization (such as spatial price discrimination). Spatial price discrimination as we know 
does not cause price co-movements between markets due to its ability to make arbitrage 
unprofitable. 
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Estimation Strategy/Procedure 
 We employ following estimation procedures to examine the questions of interest. 
 
STEP 1: First, we estimate a multivariate dynamic time series model. We then impose specific 
bivariate market integration or pricing behavior tests as restrictions for  market pairs. We save 
the P-values and Wald-statistics from these tests. 
 
STEP 2: We validate the results from STEP 1 by running a second-stage model based on the test 
statistics from the pricing behavior tests imposed on the dynamic time series model as to the 
factors that potentially influence the observed price behaviors. The most important of these 
factors is distance between the spatial markets. 
 
STEP 3: We also estimate cointegration relations for all market pairs and test for cointegration 
for each pair. 
 
 STEP 4: We next compare the results from the dynamic time series model and the cointegration 
model and examine them for theoretical consistencies as predicted by our model and the 
characteristics of the three products. 
 
3.2 GMM Dynamic Time Series Model and Market Integration Tests 
 
 In this section, we outline the framework within which we test different pricing schemes 
as possible explanations for the trajectory of observed prices within the dynamic time series 
model. Ravallion (1986) developed market integration tests to analyze both short-run and long-
run price adjustments between a dominant market and other smaller, "satellite" markets. In his 
model, the dominant (urban) market acts as a price-leader and the satellite (rural) markets, which 
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trade mainly with the dominant market and not with other satellite markets, are price-takers. 
Below is a sketch of Ravallion's model 
  1 2, , , ;   D N DP f P P P Z   (31) 
  ;        1, ,i D iP f P Z i N    (32) 
where    is the price in the dominant market,    is the price in satellite market  ,    are other 
factors that affect the price in the dominant market and    are factors that affect price in market     
 From equation (31), it can be seen that the price in the dominant market is determined by 
prices in all of the satellite markets and factors peculiar to the dominant market, while (32) says 
that the price in any individual satellite market is dependent on the price in the dominant market 
and factors peculiar to that satellite market. Ravallion's formulation implies that there are no 
intra-regional transportation costs, as the satellite markets are assumed to trade only with the 
dominant urban market - there is no intraregional trade. While these assumptions may hold for 
the market for hogs studied by Ravallion, the same assumptions cannot be said to hold for the 
timber industry, where intra-regional transportation costs are significant and where buyers and 
sellers in our model are assumed to be distributed uniformly over economic space. We therefore 
modify Ravallion's approach to fit the circumstances of our theory and data. We do this by 
extending his formulation to the case where markets are interlinked. This modified formulation is 
also consistent with our theoretical model, where we do not assume a dominant central market 
served by price-taking satellite markets. 
 Let           be prices in markets         in an n-market region where neither         is 
assumed to be dominant. With this assumption, we can write the price in market i as  
 1 2 1, ,...,( ),,n ii i inP f P P P P Z    (33) 
    and similarly for j as 
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 1 2 1, ,...,( ),,n jj j inP f P P P P Z    (34) 
 For purposes of econometric estimation, we can linearize either of equations (33) or (34), 
and make them dynamic by adding an appropriate number of lags of the dependent and 
independent variables and an error term. This gives (assuming market              and Z = 
all other markets) 
 
n m n
Xt Xt k Yt k i(Zt) t
1 k 0 3 0 1 1
P P P P Φ D
h s r
j ir X ij h i
j i r h i
W     
     
           (35) 
where PXt and PYt are the prices in locations X and Y and PiZt prices in all other markets at time t, 
Di is an appropriate dummy variable for identified shocks, such as hurricanes, international trade 
rules and policy regime changes, that affect the industry, WX are other factors specific to market 
X that affect the price there with the error process,                              and  ,    , φ 
and    are the parameters of the model to be estimated. This extensive formulation controls for 
omitted variable bias if the prices in regions X and Y also are correlated with prices in the other 
regions - a consideration to which little attention has been paid in the empirical literature.  
 However, for the estimates from equation (35) to be meaningful, we require stationarity 
in the price series. Most time series data are not stationary because they contain unit roots.
23
 
Regression analysis based on non-stationary data could lead to spurious (useless) regressions, as 
was first noted by Yule (1926) and later formalized and popularized by Granger & Newbold 
(1974).  There are many tests for stationarity, but the most common is the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF)  Unit roots test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979).
24
 The general form of the test is given as: 
                                                          
23
 A linear stochastic time series process is said to have a unit root if one (1) is a root of the characteristic equation 
of the process. 
 
24
 Other unit root tests include Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias, & Fuller (1994) and Phillips & Perron (1988) 
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1
k
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i
Y T Y Y e    

      
                 (36)
 
where   is the first-difference operator,   is the time series variable (in this case timber price), T 
is time trend,                 are the parameters and k the number of lags needed to whiten the 
noise (    (   
   ) and remove serial correlation.  This test has the null hypothesis         
(unit roots do not exist) against         . If we fail to reject the null hypothesis (existence of 
unit roots), then the data are said to be non-stationary.
25
 The ADF t-distribution does not have an 
asymptotic normal distribution, therefore the standard critical values are not valid. We therefore 
use the Dickey-Fuller distribution which has the more demanding critical values.  
 After Granger and Newbold's 1974 paper, analyses involving non-stationary data are 
done by first-differencing the data and using the differenced values in the regression analysis. If 
the data are non-stationary, purely due to unit roots, then differencing can induce stationarity and 
make regressions using the differenced data non-spurious. For example, if     and     are two 
price series integrated of order one    (     then by definition       (    and similarly for     . 
 We tested for stationarity in our data using equation (36). Using Mackinnon (1994) 
critical values and significance levels, we found that the price series were all non-stationary 
while their first differences were not, as shown in  
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 The limitation of the ADF test is that the autoregressive model for  ̂  is equivalent to imposing a common 
dynamic factor on the static regression: 
                                                               (          (      (           . 
The ability of the ADF test  to have power to reject           when it is false depends on the common factor 
restriction corresponding to the properties of the data (see Engle, Hendry, & Richard 1983 for detailed discussion of 
this drawback). 
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Table 12 (in the appendix).
26
    
 As a result of the non-stationarity in the levels of the series, we estimate  
gm n-2
Xt Xt k Yt k iZt t 
1 k 0 2 0
P π P λ P P  d
d i r
h
d ir  
   
         
                   (37)
 
 The dynamic process or lag length of the model in (37) cannot be determined 
theoretically. We therefore use Hannan-Quinn information criteria (HQIC) to select lag lengths. 
We decided on HQIC because, according to Ivanov and Killian (2001)
27
, it works better on 
quarterly data with samples of more than 120.
28
 It also is parsimonious in terms of the number of 
lags it suggests, thus saving on degrees of freedom. 
 More importantly, we need the residuals in (37) to be serially uncorrelated and to be 
white noise. We tested for serial correlation using both Durbin's alternative test and the Breusch–
Godfrey tests. We also tested for white noise of the residuals using the Portamanteau test (Q-
test). The Breusch-Pagan test of heteroscedasticity suggests that there was some 
heteroscedasticity in a few of the market pairs even after including the appropriate number of 
lags to whiten the errors. After including the appropriate number of lags to whiten the noise in 
(37), we estimate (37) with using robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator with 
the instruments being lags of the price series.  
 We considered using VAR to estimate equation (37). But given that our market 
integration tests (shown below) include contemporaneous relationships between some of the 
variables, VAR will be invalid as it will induce endogeneity. In addition, we run the risk of 
introducing severe or perfect multicollinearity into the model if we use VAR thus making the 
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 We also tested other specifications of unit root and the results were not sensitive to the inclusion of a constant or 
trend term. 
27
 In a paper by the CEPR (Ivanov & Kilian 2001),  Akaike information criterion (AIC) is more accurate with 
monthly data, HQIC works better for quarterly data on samples over 120 and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
works fine with any sample size for quarterly data. 
28
 Our data have a 131 observations for each of the 14 regions. 
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estimates unreliable (if they can be estimated at all). 
 The market integration (pricing behavior) tests we use are restrictions proposed by 
Ravallion that we imposed on (37). These restrictions are based on our theory and what to expect 
given the market structure that is assumed to be tested. They are discussed below. 
Spatial Price Discrimination: Independence 
 Spatial price discrimination is tested by imposing the following restriction on  
  
This formulation implies that all lagged and contemporaneous price effects in one market are 
independent of those in another market. In other words, firms, when discriminating, act based on 
their own cost conditions and the supply elasticities they face. They are able to offer each seller 
the “best price” possible so as to make arbitrage unprofitable thus preventing arbitrage-driven 
price co-movement. In essence, we will not observe any price co-movement between the markets 
as a result of effective spatial price discrimination by the firm. 
 
Perfect Basing Point Pricing (BPP): Strong short-run integration  
 In the presence of significant intra-regional transportation costs, arbitrage is unlikely to 
be the cause of instantaneous price adjustments across markets. Therefore, as in our model, when 
it is observed that prices adjust instantaneously across markets, it is more likely to be a case of 
BPP rather than of competitive arbitrage.
29
 To test this hypothesis, the following restriction is 
imposed on the model.  
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 There are instances where BPP can arise in non-collusive or non-price leadership settings. But as Benson et al. 
(1990) noted, the necessary conditions are very limiting. 
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The restriction here implies that price adjustments are reflected fully in the same period, with no 
lagged effects. The reason being that firms in the collusion just take the announced prices and 
immediately put them into effect without the need for adjustments. 
 
Incomplete Basing Point: Short-run integration: Cartel or Tacit Collusion 
 What if there are lagged effects in the short term? If the lagged effects in the different 
markets vanish on average, then this suggests the case of tacit collusion (if it applies to all 
markets) or a cartel (if it applies only to a subsection of the markets). The reason here being that 
for tacit collusion to persist, the parties to it will need time to respond to the price signals 
(changes) of the leading firm as the market moves to a new equilibrium. In the case of a cartel, 
only one section of the market will respond and the adjustment is likely to be slightly faster than 
in tacit collusion, provided that members do not try to cheat. The test for this hypothesis is given 
below 
 
 
Long-Run integration: Long-run price matching/F.O.B. 
 For long-run market integration, the test requires that all contemporaneous and lagged 
effects sum to one. This means that equilibrium price changes in one market net out on average 
over time to match exactly the equilibrium price changes in other markets. The test implies the 
following restriction 
   
 According to Ravallion (1986), each short-run test implies long-run integration. 
Therefore, the long-run integration test can be looked at as a feature of the BPP system.  In the 
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case that the short-run tests are rejected and the long-run tests accepted, then the empirical results 
will be consistent with either a competitive F.O.B. pricing system or increasing marginal cost 
price-discriminatory models (Faminow and Benson 1990). 
 
Decision Rule on Pricing Behavior Tests 
 For each pricing behavior or market structure test, we report the chi-square from the 
Wald-Statistic
30
 and the corresponding P-value. If the reported P-value is significant (i.e., less 
than 0.05), we reject the hypothesis that the market is characterized by that pricing 
scheme/behavior. If the P-value is insignificant, we fail to reject the null and conclude it is 
plausible. A small p-value casts doubt on the null hypothesis (hypothesized pricing behavior) 
while a big p-value lends support to it. Further tests will be employed to confirm the plausibility 
of the null in cases when it is not rejected. The next section presents how we do this and the 
methods we employ. 
 
3.3 Validation: Market Integration Tests and Determinants of Integration 
 
 We next estimate a model to help explain the factors that influence market integration 
and to validate the results from the pricing behavior tests imposed on (37). Market integration 
tests from the dynamic time series model (37) provide evidence on market integration and price 
relationships in the market pairs. In cases that the hypothesized (null) price relationship is not 
rejected, we note that it is still not sufficient to conclude that a particular market pair is 
characterized definitely by that pricing behavior. We use the results from the pricing behavior 
(market integration) tests to estimate a second-stage model that examines the relationship 
between the pricing behavior tests and economic factors that could help explain the trajectory of 
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 The traditional F-statistic is not valid under a GMM estimation. 
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the observed prices. If the parameter estimates (especially distance) are significant and conform 
to the a priori expectations (as predicted by theory) for the particular pricing behavior being 
tested, then we can conclude that the observed pricing behavior characterizes the market.  
  As our theoretical model did indicate, distance (cost of transportation) between spatial 
markets has important implications as to the kind of market structure likely to be observed. The 
sizes of firms or the degree of concentration of the markets may also influence the trajectory of 
observed prices. We construct a Herfindahl-Hirschman index from the capacities of processing 
plants in each region to use as proxy for market concentration. Another factor that could 
influence the link between markets, according to the empirical literature is the volume of activity 
in the separate markets. We can examine the effects of these factors by estimating the model 
 ( , , , , , ),xy xy x y x yf Dist Vol Vol Con Con Z   (38) 
where     = Wald statistic (Chi-Square) arising from the pricing behavior tests from the 
dynamic time series model of (37) estimated using GMM.  
 Distancexy = the distance, in miles, between market centers of yt and xt; 
 Volx = average volume of output from region x; 
 Voly = average volume of output from region y; 
 Conx = market concentration in region x; 
 Cony = market concentration in region y; 
 Z = product dummy variables. 
 
Estimation Method(s) 
 Normality tests using the Jarque-Bera test indicate that the dependent variable is not 
normally distributed. This could be because the values of the dependent variable are restricted as 
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are the Wald-statistics to be nonnegative positive values. Wooldridge (1992) argues that if the 
dependent variable is strictly nonnegative, then it is advisable to model the expected regression 
model directly rather than using a transformation (usually the natural log) and specifying a model 
linear in parameters with an additive error. As a result, we estimate (38) using a Poisson 
Regression Model optimized using quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) and a Gamma 
(Exponential) Regression Model, also optimized using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator 
(QMLE). Regardless of the nature of the dependent variable - provided that it is nonnegative and 
has no natural bound we can always apply the Poisson QMLE (Wooldridge 2010, p. 741). 
Wooldridge makes the case that both the Poisson and Gamma QMLE are fully robust to 
distributional misspecifications other than those of the conditional mean thus making them 
appropriate for our analyses. 
 The a priori expectations of the parameters in equation (38) depend on the pricing 
behavior test being validated. Recall that a small Wald statistic or chi-square (a high p-value) 
from the GMM pricing behavior tests of 37 will imply that the null hypothesis of the posited 
pricing behavior is supported (not rejected). Therefore, if an explanatory variable has a positive 
effect on the dependent variable (chi-square), then evidence is shifted towards rejecting the 
hypothesized pricing behavior. This is so because an increase in the chi-square (due to an 
increase in the explanatory variable) will decrease the p-value and, hence, lead to a rejection of 
the null of the hypothesized pricing behavior.  
 
A priori Expectations 
 If our F.O.B. market integration test is valid, then we will expect a negative relationship 
between F.O.B. pricing and distance (i.e., a positive relationship between the chi-square value of 
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the F.O.B. pricing behavior test imposed on all three products and the distance between the 
markets being tested). This means that as distance increases, opportunities for arbitrage decline 
hence F.O.B. decreases - a prediction in our theoretical model that integration decays with 
distance between markets. 
 For our tests on BPP to be valid, we should expect that distance should not have a 
significant effect on the BPP chi-squares. 
 In the case of incomplete basing point pricing, the effect of distance will depend on 
whether prices are determined by a cartel or collusion. In the case of a collusion (where the entire 
market is involved), distance should not have a significant effect. However, in the case of a 
cartel, where opportunities to cheat rise with distance, we will expect that as distance increases, 
that cartel-like pricing is less salient as members try to cheat. (i.e., there is a positive relationship 
between distance and the chi-square value of the incomplete BPP test). 
 As described in chapter 2, firms in spatial markets have market power. This power will 
be stronger the greater the distance between the spatially dispersed firms and the larger is the 
relative cost of transporting the product between markets .Therefore, we expect a negative 
relationship between the chi-square statistic from the test of price discrimination across markets 
and the distance between the markets. This will go to confirm that market power for spatially 
located firms increase with distance. As a result of this market power, they can adopt non-
competitive pricing schemes such as price discrimination. 
 The effect of the volume of output on market integration is not very clear. According to 
Lang and Rosa (1981) and Buccola (1985), high volume regions are usually more efficient 
because information about prices is more frequently observed and readily available. Low volume 
markets, on the other hand, may experience price swings not in line with other markets. For 
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instance, shutting down one processing plant in a low volume market could have dramatic effects 
on price swings in that region. Therefore, the a priori expectations with respect to volume of 
output will be a fact of the data.  
 Finally, the degree of buyer concentration in timber markets may influence the kind of 
pricing behaviors observed in these markets. In highly concentrated markets, if the buyers 
compete without geographic restrictions (i.e., no defined market boundaries), then one will 
expect more efficiency and price stability. The story is similar for concentration in the "away" 
market. Since we do not have enough data to delineate these effects, we will rely solely on our 
empirical estimates of the effect of concentration on pricing behaviors in spatial timber markets. 
 
3.4 Cointegration Tests of Spatial Price Relationships 
 
 Cointegration analyses have been used widely to draw conclusions with respect to 
integration or otherwise of timber markets. Cointegrated markets are usually termed as integrated 
and vice versa. In what follows, we briefly outline the idea of cointegration and its application to 
timber markets. 
 In general, two series are cointegrated of order (d, b) if the individual series are integrated 
of order (d) and their linear combination is integrated of order (d-b) (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
According to Hamilton (1994), cointegration implies that although there may be developments 
that cause permanent changes in the series, there is some long-term equilibrium relation that ties 
the individual series together.
31
 Cointegration analysis makes it possible to derive useful results 
from two or more non-stationary variables that have a stable long-run equilibrium relationship 
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 An equilibrium relationship in the context of cointegration is not the same thing as market clearing, but rather is a 
long term stable relationship between the variables. 
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from which they cannot drift too far apart.
32
 Deviations from this long term equilibrium 
relationship as a result of random shocks therefore will be corrected over time.  
 Analyses of spatial market integration usually posit a parity relationship in which price 
changes in one market are reflected in equilibrium price changes in another. Given two non-
stationary price series                we can write this relationship as: 
 
1 0yt xt tP P u                                                                       (39) 
If    is stationary, then the price series are said to be cointegrated. This requires that we test for 
the stationarity of     Testing for the stationarity of    can be done using the ADF test presented 
in (36) by replacing    with    as below 
 0 1 1
1
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t t i t i t
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u T u u e    

         (40) 
 
 If      (  , then             are said to be cointegrated of order 0 with cointegrating 
vector  , and equation (39) is referred to as the cointegrating regression.33  For there to be a 
genuine causal link between the two integrated price series             then    from (40) must 
be  (   or a "nonsense" regression has been estimated (Henry and Juselius, 2000). 
 There are many tests for cointegration but the two main tests are the Engle-Granger two-
step method and the Johansen procedure.
34
 It is usually not obvious which testing procedure is 
best because cointegration does not say anything about the direction of causality. For example, 
between the price series                 for markets X, Y, and Z, if one of the markets is a price 
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A similar concept was first mentioned by Davidson et al. (1978), in which the authors argued the need for a model 
to estimate time series that tend to move together with a stable long-run equilibrium relationship (Davidson, Hendry, 
Srba, & Yeo, 1978). 
33
 According to Henry and Juselius (2000 p. 16), "... unlike differencing, there is no guarantee that         
       (   for any value of   ". Note:   is        vector of coefficients. 
34
 Another commonly used test for cointegration is the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) Cointegration Test, which has a null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. 
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leader, the leader's price would influence prices in the other markets. This way, cointegration 
could be analyzed from the equations for the followers', given the price of the leader using 
bivariate methods. On the other hand, if no market is a leader, all prices would be ‘equilibrium 
adjusting’ and, hence, all equations would contain information about the cointegration 
relationships, which means that a simultaneous equations method will be required to determine 
cointegration.  
 However, for the current analysis, an exhaustive bivariate approach is appropriate for 
comparison purposes and for threshing out the questions, we ask in this dissertation. For 
example, a bivariate analysis allows us to examine subtle price relationships between pairs of 
markets that will otherwise not be obvious in a systems approach. 
 
Engle-Granger Causality Test 
 Engle and Granger (1987) suggest a two-step OLS procedure for evaluating the 
cointegration properties of I(1) times series data. 
Step 1: Estimate the parameters of the cointegration relation 
 If     and     are integrated of the same order (specifically  (  ), we estimate  the static 
regression model                 
                   
where  ̂ is the OLS estimate of the long-run parameter vector   and save the residuals  ̂ . The 
estimates from the cointegrating equation are superconsistent (Hamilton, 1994), but they are non-
normally distributed, which means that they cannot be used for hypothesis testing (Brooks, 
2008). 
Step 2: Test stationarity of cointegratting vector (Error Correction Model) 
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 Use the residuals from step 1 and test that  ̂   (  , i.e., testing that the residuals from 
step (1) are stationary using the ADF test. If  ̂   (   is found to be true, then the series are said 
to be cointegrated. If that is not true, the series are not cointegrated and the estimates from the 
first stage are not usable because they might have been spurious. 
 The Engle-Granger procedure, even though simple, comes with some limitations. First, it 
requires treating one of the variables as exogenous, i.e., a one-way causal relationship. If this 
assumption is not true, then the estimates would be inefficient and seriously biased, depending 
on which variable is used as dependent variable and which is the independent variable. Closely 
related to the first is the fact that the technique does not allow for testing cases where there is 
more than one cointegrating relations/vectors. Also, the estimates from the cointegrating 
equation, as mentioned earlier, are not normally distributed and thus do not support any 
hypothesis testing. Finally, the power of the test is compromised when the sample size is small 
(Brooks, 2008 p. 340).   
 As discussed earlier, most recent studies on timber market integration have tested market 
integration using cointegration analysis. But competitive market integration in spatial markets 
implies F.O.B. pricing. Therefore, testing and drawing conclusions about spatial market 
integration using cointegration analysis assumes that F.O.B. pricing is being tested. However, 
because quantity data are usually not available, most of the tests are done using price series 
alone. We therefore run the risk of interpreting price integration as market integration when we 
rely only on cointegration analysis. 
 
3.5. Summary 
 This chapter outlined the empirical approach we adopt to answer the questions of this 
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dissertation. Generally, we use a dynamic multivariate GMM estimation procedure to test 
bivariate price behaviors for all market pairs. We then validated the use of these tests by 
estimating a second-stage multivariate regression using both a Gamma and Poisson Generalized 
Linear Methods on the factors that are hypothesized to determine spatial pricing behaviors. For 
comparison and to point out the inadequacies of conventional methods, we also presented a 
conventional method used by previous studies - bivariate cointegration analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA, RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
4.1 Data 
 
 Data for the dynamic time series model (GMM) and the cointegration analysis are 
quarterly delivered price data for PST, PPW and CNS obtained from Timber Mart-South (TMS) 
spanning the period from the last quarter of 1976 to the second quarter of 2009. This gives a total 
of 131 observations per series - the longest series yet used in any analysis of the industry. TMS 
at the moment reports data for two price regions within each state in the U.S. South (Figure 4). 
This means that for our seven states, there are 14 series of regional price data for PST and PPW. 
Price data on CNS for Arkansas region 2 has too many missing values. As a result, CNS price 
data for Arkansas region 2 is dropped, thus leaving 13 regions to carry the analysis on. 
 
Figure 4: Timber Mart South Price Regions
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Summary statistics for the price series are presented in Table 3. From the table, it can be seen 
that PST prices are consistently higher than those of both CNS and PPW for all regions while the 
prices of CNS exceed those of PPW. Georgia region 2 (GA2) has the highest average price for 
PPW, while Alabama Region 2 (AL2) has the highest price both for CNS and PST. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Product Prices by State 
 
REGION PINE PULPWOOD PINE CHIP N SAW PINE SAW TIMBER 
 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
AL1 20.0 4.6 11.9 33.3 31.0 10.3 11.9 57.4 39.5 15.6 15.0 67.8 
AL2 20.6 3.8 12.6 30.6 33.4 10.9 16.7 59.2 42.3 14.5 18.9 68.6 
AR1 20.2 5.0 11.4 34.5 29.7 9.2 15.0 52.5 39.0 13.7 17.3 66.2 
AR2 19.0 4.5 11.2 34.7 na na na na 34.7 13.1 13.8 63.5 
FL1 21.1 4.1 12.3 32.9 31.1 9.0 16.3 50.0 38.5 13.3 17.7 65.6 
FL2 20.5 3.8 13.1 29.0 30.1 8.4 14.0 45.3 37.8 12.5 15.3 66.7 
GA1 19.9 4.5 11.8 29.5 31.6 10.7 13.3 55.9 37.7 14.6 13.3 63.8 
GA2 21.3 4.4 11.9 32.7 33.3 10.2 18.0 56.5 41.8 13.9 19.3 66.0 
LA1 20.9 4.9 10.3 34.7 29.9 10.2 12.4 56.2 38.1 13.6 18.8 67.3 
LA2 20.5 4.4 11.8 30.0 29.2 9.0 13.8 56.2 36.7 12.2 17.2 65.0 
MS1 19.9 4.6 11.4 31.0 30.0 9.9 15.3 50.0 37.0 14.0 15.6 60.0 
MS2 19.8 4.0 12.0 32.0 31.0 9.5 14.7 52.5 38.5 12.6 18.0 61.0 
SC1 18.6 3.7 11.8 28.9 29.0 8.3 10.7 46.7 36.4 13.5 14.3 59.3 
SC2 20.4 3.9 12.0 29.6 30.9 8.0 17.1 50.4 39.9 12.4 19.3 63.2 
  
          
             
              We report the percentage differences between product prices, by region,  in Table 4. PST has a 
price premium over CNS that lies between 19.1 percent (in GA1) and 31.3 percent (in AR1). The 
premium is even greater when we compare PST to PPW - as much as 105.2 percent (in AL2). 
When we compare CNS to PPW, CNS has a price premium over PPW of between 42.7 percent 
(in LA2) and 62.1 percent (in AL2). 
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Table 4: Percentage Differences in Average Prices by Region 
 
 
REGION PST  and  PCNS PST and  PPW PCNS and PPW 
 
AL1 27.48443 97.68813 55.06845 
AL2 26.60026 105.2086 62.09181 
AR1 31.2596 92.92839 46.98231 
AR2 Na 82.90812 na 
FL1 23.7761 82.34394 47.31757 
FL2 25.73299 84.60812 46.82552 
GA1 19.07157 89.09266 58.80587 
GA2 25.62422 96.06274 56.07082 
LA1 27.52353 82.67834 43.2507 
LA2 25.87834 79.60681 42.68285 
MS1 23.26414 85.82267 50.75161 
MS2 23.95669 94.16381 56.63842 
SC1 25.66885 95.56202 55.61694 
SC2 29.0369 95.95899 51.86276 
 
 
  As an empirical note and in line with our theory that products with higher prices (relative 
to transportation costs) are more likely to be shipped across regions, we expect to see absolutely 
larger F.O.B. price relations in the PST markets than in, say, the PPW markets.  
 For the GLM analysis on factors determining market integration, we required data on 
transportation cost between regions, market concentration and volumes of output in each region. 
Data on distance (which is our proxy for transportation costs) was obtained using Google maps, 
calculating the distances between the geographic centers of Timber Mart South regions 
(Bingham et al. 2001). We use ground distance because we believe that most timber is carted by 
land for the regions concerned. 
 Timber volume data was obtained from the yearly reports for each region from the 
resource bulletins of the Southern Research Division of the United States Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry Service for each state. The data are reported for each county in a state. 
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To get the data by TMS market regions, we code and categorize the counties by the 
classifications given for TMS price regions. 
 The market concentration measure used in our analysis for each TMS region is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. These were computed from capacity data, also gathered from 
resource bulletins of the Southern Research Division of the United States Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry Service for each state. Summary statistics are given in Table 14 
(Appendix C). 
 
4.2 Results and Analysis 
 
4.2.1 Pricing Behavior (Market Integration) Tests 
 
 Equation 37 was estimated using GMM for each of the three products. This led to a total 
of 519 regression equations (PST - 181, PPW - 181 and CNS - 155). For each estimated 
regression equation, we separately imposed bivariate market integration tests and reported the 
Wald-Statistic as well as the p-values for the various tests. This exhaustive approach results in a 
total of 2068 bivariate restrictions for all three products. The results for the integration tests are 
reported in Table 15, 16 and 17 for CNS, PPW and PST, respectively. If the reported p-value is 
small (less than 0.05 in this case), we reject the null hypothesis (hypothesized pricing behavior) 
and conclude that the alternative is true. If the reported p-value is greater than 0.05, it means that 
we fail to reject the null and conclude that it is plausible.
35
 
 In Table 5 we report the number of regions for which the hypothesized pricing behavior 
could not be rejected and the percentage of the market that this represents - a summary of the 
extensive results from Table 15, 16 and 17. It is obvious from Table 5 that no one pricing scheme 
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  At this stage, it will be premature to conclude that the null is true or that the alternative is false. We can only say 
that the null is plausible. 
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completely characterizes the trajectory of observed prices for any of the products for the whole 
of the South-East South Central States of the United states being considered in this study. 
However, a significant number of the markets are characterized by some form of pricing 
behavior or the other. These results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Summary of Decision Rules on Pricing Behavior Tests 
 
PRICING 
BEHAVIOR PST (181) 
 
CNS (155) 
 
PPW (181) 
 
 
Number of 
Regions 
Percentage 
of Market 
Number of 
Regions 
Percentage 
of Market 
Number of 
Regions 
Percentage 
of Market 
 
FOB 60 33 32 21 10 6 
Price Discrim. 36 20 37 24 35 19 
Incomp. BPP 25 14 20 13 33 18 
Complete BPP 2 1 0 0 9 5 
 
 
Price Discrimination 
There is evidence of price discrimination for all three products. Between 19 to 24 percent 
of the markets (depending on the product considered) exhibit signs of price discrimination 
 
Complete Basing Point Pricing 
 Complete basing point pricing was rare. There was no evidence of complete(perfect) 
basing point pricing in the market for CNS. However, nine market regions (about 5 percent of 
the market) for PPW were deemed to be practicing some form of basing point pricing. In the 
market for PPW, South Carolina Region 1 (SC1) bases on SC2 while SC2 bases on AR1. Florida 
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Region 1 also bases on LA1 and AR2 while Florida Region 2 bases on LA1 and AR2. There also 
was evidence of AL2 basing on LA1. There are also two complete basing point regions for PST 
where FL2 and AR2 were both basing on SC2. 
 
Incomplete Basing Point Pricing  
 Incomplete basing point pricing (the weaker form of basing point pricing), was rejected 
in a majority of the cases. However, there was some anecdotal evidence of incomplete basing 
point for all products. For PST, 14 percent of the market (25 regions) practiced some form of 
basing point pricing while 13 and 18 percent practiced some form of basing point pricing in the 
markets for CNS and PPW respectively. Recall that collusive basing point pricing can be 
complete (in which case the whole market is involved in a collusion) or incomplete (in which 
case only a section of the market is a involved in a collusion (cartel). Since basing point pricing 
was not widespread and did not cover the whole market, we conclude that some form of a cartel 
is being operated. 
 
Long-Run Price Integration (F.O.B.) 
 Long-run price matching (F.O.B.) was not rejected in a number of markets. There was 
evidence of F.O.B. pricing in about 33 percent of the market for PST, 21 percent for CNS and 6 
percent for PPW. The higher valued products tend to exhibit more F.O.B. pricing than the lower 
valued products - consistent with our theory.  
 Recall from Table 4 that PST is the most valued of the three products, followed by CNS. 
PST prices averaged two times the prices of PPW while CNS averaged one and a half times the 
price of PPW. Therefore, the observation that PST has more F.O.B. pricing regions than both 
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CNS and PPW is consistent with our a priori expectations that higher valued products are more 
likely to exhibit F.O.B. pricing (because the opportunities for arbitrage profits are higher) than 
lower valued products. In other words, for the same percentage change in prices, opportunities 
for arbitrage profits increase more for the higher valued timber product than the lesser valued 
timber products. 
 
Market Efficiency 
 There is no complete spatial market integration for any of the three products in the sense 
of F.O.B. pricing. This can be seen from the fact that no product has all market regions pricing 
F.O.B. However since there are more PST markets characterized by F.O.B. pricing than CNS 
and PPW, the evidence suggests that PST markets are more efficient than those for CNS and 
PPW, probably due to arbitrage. This argument is supported by the fact that CNS and PPW 
markets are characterized by more non-competitive pricing behaviors/schemes than those of 
PST.  It must however be noted that the fact that PST has more markets that price F.O.B. than 
CNS and PPW (or less markets that price non-competitive than CNS and PPW) does not mean 
that PST is an efficient market. There are more regional markets for PST that do not subscribe to 
F.O.B. It is an efficient market relative only to CNS and PPW. 
 
4.2.2 Determinants of Spatial Market Integration and Validation of Market Integration 
Tests 
 So far, the results from the pricing behavior tests are consistent with predictions of our 
theoretical model - higher valued products are more likely to price F.O.B. than lower valued 
products, assuming the same transportation costs. But as stated earlier, failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of a particular pricing behavior is not enough evidence to conclude that the null is not 
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rejected or as to the validity of the market integration test imposed on the model. For instance, 
the results may not be valid if the market integration tests do not maintain a certain minimum 
empirical relation with factors deemed to be determinants of pricing behaviors in spatial markets 
- important amongst them is the distance between the markets. We therefore provide further 
evidence on the validity of our model and tests by estimating model (38), as described earlier. 
The model was run using both Poisson and Gamma distributions in a quasi maximum likelihood 
optimization framework. The results are qualitatively similar for both estimation procedures. We 
report the results from the Poisson distribution in Table 6 and those of the gamma distribution in 
Table 7. 
 Since our dependent variable is the Wald-Statistic (chi-square) from the pricing behavior 
test, a positive parameter estimate will increase the chi-square (decrease the p-value), which 
reduces the likelihood of that particular test being accepted. Positive parameter estimates 
therefore imply a decrease in the likelihood of observing the posited pricing behavior, and vice 
versa. 
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Table 6: Poisson GLM Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
 
F.O.B 
Price 
Discrimination Complete BPP Incomplete BPP 
 
Distance 0.000467* -0.000577*** 0.000365 0.00175*** 
 
(0.028) (0.001) (0.109 (0) 
     Concentration Home -0.0000213 0.0000125 -0.0000374* 0.000121*** 
 
(0.233) (0.423) (0.036) (0) 
     Concentration Away 0.0000295 -0.00000464 0.000036 0.000165*** 
 
(0.222) (0.74) (0.106) (0) 
     Volume Home 0.00000161 0.00000281 -0.00000312 0.000001.16*** 
 
(0.176) (0.746) (0.072) (0) 
     Volume Away -0.0000028 0.0000001.14 -0.0000009.78 0.000007.31 
 
(0.053) (0.907) (0.576) (0) 
     PSTD Dummy -0.385*** -0.498*** -0.724*** 0.0285 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0.811) 
     PPWD Dummy -0.542*** 0.0372 0.225* -0.0114 
 
(0) (0.637) (0.024) (0.921) 
     Constant 2.516*** 2.245*** 4.681*** 3.220*** 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
 
N 520 520 520 520 
 
p-values in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 7: Gamma GLM Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
 
F.O.B 
Price 
Discrimination Complete BPP 
Incomplete 
BPP 
 
Distance 0.0000382* -0.000114*** -0.0000034 0.000650*** 
 
(0.024) (0) (0.115) (0.001) 
     Concentration 
Home 0.00000198 0.0000035 0.000000365* -0.0000334* 
 
(0.239) (0.069) (0.034) (0.037) 
     Concentration 
Away -0.00000209 0.00000616*** -0.000000312 0.0000364 
 
(0.227) (0.001) (0.094) (0.123) 
     Volume Home -0.000001.2 0.000000295** 0.000000298 0.00000155 
 
(0.205) (0.004) (0.059) (0.252) 
     Volume Away 0.000000274* 0.00000327** 0.000000112 -0.00000239 
 
(0.028) (0.004) (0.514) (0.083) 
     PSTD Dummy 0.0301*** 0.0904*** 0.0104*** -0.307*** 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0.001) 
     PPWD Dummy 0.0463*** 0.0054 -0.00190* -0.347*** 
 
(0) (0.526) (0.022) (0) 
     Constant 0.0797*** 0.102*** 0.00909*** 3.220*** 
 
(0) (0) (0.001) (0) 
 
N 520 520 520                     520 520 
 
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Distance between markets 
 For F.O.B. pricing, we observe that distance has the expected a priori expected sign and 
also is significant at the 5 percent level. This means that as the distance between markets 
increases, we are less likely to observe efficient spatial market integration (F.O.B.). This finding 
is consistent with our theory that market integration decays with distance i.e. opportunities for 
arbitrage diminish with increasing distance. 
 Firms in spatial markets hold market power due to their geographic locations. Therefore, 
as the distance between markets increases (assuming that suppliers are uniformly distributed over 
that distance), we will expect price discrimination to increase. This prediction is confirmed by 
our empirical test, which has the expected a priori sign and also is significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
 Complete basing point pricing, by its very nature, is not expected to depend on distance. 
Therefore, for there to be support for our test of basing point pricing, we expect that distance 
between markets should not be a significant determinant of the observed pricing behavior. This 
also is confirmed by our estimates.  
 Finally, incomplete basing point pricing arising from collusion should not depend 
significantly on distance between the markets. However, if there is no perfectly functioning 
basing point pricing system that encompasses the whole market (in which case we are talking 
about a cartel), then distance may be a significant determinant of the feasibility of that system. 
As distance between cartel members increase, the incentives to cheat also increase (because of 
less supervision). Therefore, one will expect incomplete basing point pricing to decrease with 
increases in distance as confirmed, by our estimates. 
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Volume of output 
 The volume of timber production did not have significant influences on F.O.B. pricing, 
price discrimination and the theory of complete basing point pricing. However, high volume in 
the home market was found to be negatively related to incomplete basing point pricing. A 
possible explanation is that, if the volume of output available to a "home" firm increases, it has 
less incentive to maintain a collusive agreement because they can do better by discrimination. 
  
Concentration 
 Concentration of mills at home did not have a significant effect in explaining F.O.B. 
pricing or price discrimination. However, concentration at home was found to be significantly 
and positively related to perfect basing point pricing and negatively related to incomplete basing 
point pricing. Concentration in the "away" market also was found to have a significantly negative 
effect on incomplete basing point pricing alone. 
 
4.2.3 Cointegration Tests of Market Integration 
 
The results of the Engel - Granger cointegration tests are presented in Table 18 19 and 20 for 
CNS, PPW and PST, respectively. We summarize these results in Table 8 where we present the 
number of markets deemed to be cointegrated by the tests and the corresponding market 
percentages. We also estimated the model for a different time period (1982 to 2004), but the 
results were the same both qualitatively and quantitatively, thus suggesting that the cointegration 
relation between these markets has been stable. 
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Table 8: Summary of Cointegration Results 
Product Total Regions Cointegrated Markets 
Percentage 
Cointegrated 
PST 181 84 46 
CNS 155 78 50 
PPW 181 130 72 
 
 By the bivariate cointegration tests, the whole of the southeast south-central regions of 
the United States is not one market for any of the three products. However, the results do 
indicate varying degrees of integration for the various products. Market integration is found to 
range between 46 and 72 percent of the markets depending on the product considered. Pine 
Pulpwood markets are more integrated than both Pine Saw Timber and Pine Chip and Saw. The 
least integrated of the markets, as suggested by cointegration tests, is Pine Saw Timber. These 
results support results by previous studies of the industry, such as Bingham et al. (2003), for 
PPW. But do the results suggested by cointegration tests support what is expected from 
economic theory and our theoretical model? 
 
4.2.4 Comparison of Results: GMM Dynamic Time Series and Cointegration 
 
 The results of the cointegration tests suggest that more market regions were integrated 
than were suggested by the F.O.B. tests imposed on our dynamic time series model for each of 
the products. Furthermore, we observe that, contrary to a priori expectations, the lower valued 
product (PPW) has more integrated market regions than the higher valued product (PST). Since 
most timber market studies use cointegration analysis to test for market integration, it can be 
concluded that PPW markets are more integrated than PST markets even though theory suggests 
that the reverse should be the case, especially if arbitrage is deemed to be the error correction 
mechanism.  
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 The implication of this result is that some basing point price regions that have been stable 
over a long period probably tested positive for cointegration and thus were assessed wrongly as 
comprising integrated markets. Table 9 helps investigate this point further. It is clear from the 
table that a substantial number of the price regions that were deemed to be practicing basing 
point pricing are also found to be cointegrated. Between 55 and 65 percent of all basing point 
price regions also were cointegrated.  This suggests the possibility that some of the basing point 
price regions were wrongly considered to be competitively integrated, especially insofar as the 
cointegrated results contradict theoretical expectations. 
Table 9: Comparison: Cointegrated and BPP Markets 
PRODUCT (A) (B) (C) (D) 
 
F.O.B. Cointegrated BPP 
Common: 
Coint & BPP 
% (#) % (#) % (#) % (#) 
PST 33(60) 46 (84) 14 (25) 56 (14) 
CNS 21(32) 50 (78) 13 (20) 65 (13) 
PPW 6(10) 72 (130) 33 (18) 55 (18) 
 
 In conclusion, while cointegration is consistent with price integration, spatial price 
integration is not the same as spatial market integration. The latter necessarily requires arbitrage 
(movement of physical quantities of the product between markets). Therefore, testing 
competitive market integration by relying only on cointegration may be misleading. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 We tested the theoretical predictions of our model in this chapter. We find that there is 
not a single market for any of the three products in the southeast southcentral regions considered 
in this study. However, consistent with our theory, we find more F.O.B. price relations in the 
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higher valued product market (PST) than the lesser valued products markets (PPW and CNS). 
Testing the validity of our empirical tests, we find that all four pricing behavior tests had the 
expected sign and magnitude.  
 We then tested market integration using conventional cointegration analysis. The results 
from the cointegration analysis also showed that not a single market exist for any of the three 
products. However, contrary to our theory, there were more cointegration relations for the lesser 
valued product than the higher valued product. This tended to imply that the lesser valued 
product markets are more integrated than the higher valued product markets - a puzzle. To solve 
the puzzle, we inspected the cointegrated markets and compared them with those of basing point 
markets. This exercise revealed that between 55 to 65 percent of the markets that are deemed to 
be practicing some form of basing point pricing also are deemed to be cointegrated. This 
possibly solves the puzzle - some basing point price regions are also cointegrated and thus 
considered integrated when they are not.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 The economic importance of the forestry industry cannot be underestimated. In many 
countries it provides income and important job opportunities, especially so in rural areas. The 
role of the industry means that there is the need for efficient forest product markets so that its 
societal benefits will be maximized. The degree and extent to which spatial markets are 
integrated has several implications for public policy. The degree of integration can give an 
indication as to the competitive nature of the markets. If it is shown that markets are not 
competitive, then policy measures can be taken to correct the imperfections and ensure optimal 
resource allocation. On the other hand, if there is significant competitive spatial integration 
between markets, then any policy intervention will lead only to welfare losses and negatively 
affect all participating agents in the market. Another important implication is that the lack of 
integration between markets is not enough evidence to conclude that firms in the industry are 
violating anti-trust rules. In the presence of spatial market power, we observe that firms may 
have an incentive to engage in spatial price discrimination. Spatial price discrimination even 
though not as efficient as F.O.B. pricing is still superior to a single price monopoly or collusion 
by firms. 
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5.2 Summary of Findings 
 
 In this dissertation, we begun by asking: Are timber markets for three timber products 
(PST, PPW and CNS) for seven U.S. states in the southeast and south central integrated? What is 
the market structure and the pricing behavior that characterize these products markets? And, 
finally, can price cointegrations or correlations be interpreted to be indicative of the degree of 
competitive market integration for these three products? We sought answers to these questions 
through a combination of theoretical and empirical models. 
 We set out by modeling the economic impacts of oligopsony in the procurement of 
timber products, assuming that there are significant intra-regional transportation costs for timber.  
We find that 
 The extent of spatial market integration will be limited by significant transfer costs 
and increasing distance between markets. 
 The distance between markets provides firms with an economic incentive to price 
non-competitively. The incentive to price discriminate rises as firms realize that their 
nearest rival was faraway. Firms also had an incentive to adopt some form of 
collusive basing point pricing given the significant transportation costs of the product. 
Basing point pricing could have empirical properties similar to most conventional 
methods of testing for spatial timber market integration. This thus suggests that price 
cointegrations may not necessarily imply market integration. 
 Finally, given the significance of transportation costs, our model predicted that higher 
valued products are more likely to be competitively integrated than those for lower 
valued products because opportunities for arbitrage profits are higher with the former 
than with the latter. 
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 We next use a combination of statistical methods to test the predictions of our model 
empirically using data on the three timber products. The empirical analysis showed that 
 There was no evidence to support the claim that the southeast south-central states 
considered in this study constituted a single integrated market for any of the three 
products. However, bivariate market integration tests provided support for market 
integration between pairs of regions. There was 33 percent market integration in PST 
markets, 21 percent in CNS and 6 percent in PPW. 
 From the market integration tests, we observed that in support of our theoretical 
model, the higher valued products have greater degrees of market integration than the 
lesser valued products. 
 Price discrimination as a possible explanation of pricing behaviors in some market 
pairs could not be rejected. There was evidence of spatial price discrimination in 20 
percent of PST markets, 24 percent of CNS markets and 19 percent of PPW markets. 
 Between 13 to 18 percent of the price series could not reject the hypothesis that 
basing point pricing possibly explains the trajectory of observed prices with the most 
basing point regions occurring in PPW (18 percent). 
 To validate these the tests of pricing behaviors and market integration, we examined the 
factors that possibly explain the pricing behavior observed and found that 
 distance (transportation costs) had the expected sign and magnitude for all of the 
pricing behavior tests. 
 Market concentration also had the expected sign and magnitude for the pricing 
behavior tests. 
 Timber volume was not significant in explaining most of the tests 
78 
 To answer the question empirically as to whether price correlations or cointegrations in 
timber markets imply market integration, we tested for cointegration for all market pairs and 
examined the results for theoretical consistencies. We find that 
 cointegration analysis suggested that more market pairs were integrated than found 
using the multivariate dynamic time series model with integration running from 46 
percent (PST) to 72 percent (PPW) compared to the 6 to 33 percent that we had using 
the multivariate dynamic time series model.  
 However, examining the cointegration results for theoretical correctness revealed that 
the lesser valued product markets (PPW, in particular) were deemed to be more 
integrated than the higher valued product markets (PST). This is at variance with our 
model prediction that higher valued markets should be more integrated than those for 
lesser valued products. 
 Since theory showed that BPP could have empirical properties similar to other 
conventional methods of market integration tests, such as cointegration, we proceeded 
to compare the BPP regions with the cointegration regions to see if there were any 
regions common to the two. We find that between 55 to 65 percent of the regions that 
were found to exhibit signs of basing point pricing also were cointegrated. Given that 
the cointegration results are at variance with theory, we lean towards the conclusion 
that some BPP regions were wrongly considered to be integrated markets by 
conventional methods using cointegration tests. By this account, we conclude that 
price correlations or cointegrations do not necessary imply market integration. 
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5.3 Policy Implications 
 This dissertation has important implications for industrial policy and anti-trust law, 
especially with the recent wave of anti-trust violation charges brought against some major 
players (buyers) in the market. It provides evidence to support the argument that in spatial 
markets, it is unlikely that firms will price F.O.B. throughout the whole market. Therefore, 
public policy towards businesses that are informed by the assumption that prices are quoted 
F.O.B. may be misleading, especially if competitors are located further away. Firms may have an 
incentive to price discriminate in spatial markets as distance increases between buyers and 
sellers, yet if care is not taken, this may be misconstrued as collusion; policies based on this 
conclusion may have unintended consequences. For instance, in an econometric study of an Ohio 
price-fixing case, the authors inferred that a collusive basing point pricing was in place based on 
evidence that some sellers of dairy products closer to a school district submitted contract bids for 
supplying milk that were higher than diaries further away from that school district. They claim 
that if competition characterized the pricing and bidding behaviors of firms, then bids should 
have been an increasing function of distance. While it is possible that firms could be colluding 
and territorially segmenting the markets in which they competed, the pricing behaviors of the 
firms also are consistent with spatial price discrimination where firms exploit their market power 
over customers closer to them while they compete for those further away. In this case, prices will 
be a decreasing function of distance. 
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Omitted Equations 
Market Supply functions and price functions for Y and Z 
When    , then 
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Using the following profit function combined with the boundary conditions below 
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The price reaction functions for Y and Z can thus be specified as  
, , , , , , ,TY
TY TY
dG dH
P a b v mfc G H
dP dP
 
  
 
         
    (22) 
 , , , , ,TZ
TZ
dH
P a b v mfc H
dP
 
  
 
         
    (23) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
 0 1 1
1
k
t t i t i t
i
Y T Y Y e    

         
 
 
 
92 
APPENDIX B 
93 
Price Discrimination Graphical illustration 
Discriminatory pricing and F.O.B. pricing  (Red dotted lines are the discriminatory price 
schedules) 
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Figure 5: Spatial Price Discrimination 
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Tables and Some Results 
Table 10: Timber Imports and Exports Trends by Species and Major Trade Partners 
 
 
1990 
 
1995 
 
1996 - 2000 2001 - 2005 2006 - 2007 
 
PRODUCT 
Bd Ft. 
(Millio
ns) 
Perce
nt of 
total 
Bd Ft. 
(Millio
ns) 
Perce
nt of 
total 
Bd Ft. 
(Millio
ns) 
Perce
nt of 
total 
Bd Ft. 
(Millio
ns) 
Perce
nt of 
total 
Bd Ft. 
(Millio
ns) 
Perce
nt of 
total 
 
IMPORTS 
          Lumber, 
total 13063 100 17524 100 19019 100 23018 100 24422 100 
  Softwoods 12831 98 17169 98 18474 97 22187 96 23953 98 
  
Hardwoods 232 2 354 2 545 3 824 4 447 2 
Total share: 
Canada 11925 91 17015 97 18049 95 20334 88 21369 88 
Logs, total 23 100 80 100 231 100 528 100 502 100 
  Softwoods 13 57 55 69 190 79 459 87 459 92 
  
Hardwoods 10 44 26 33 41 21 69 13 43 8 
Total share: 
Canada 19 84 56 70 207 89 500 95 441 88 
           EXPORTS 
          
 
          Lumber, 
total 4623 100 2958 100 2654 100 2619 100 2632 100 
  Softwoods 3753 81 1872 63 1479 55 922 37 1029 39 
  
Hardwoods 813 18 1057 36 1171 45 1635 60 1297 49 
    To: 
Canada 647 14 651 22 666 25 637 24 724 28 
        Japan 1294 28 979 33 545 21 201 8 105 4 
        Europe 694 15 503 17 547 21 386 15 421 16 
Logs, total 4213 100 2820 100 2224 100 2104 100 2154 100 
  Softwoods 3994 95 2552 91 1880 84 1546 74 1654 77 
  
Hardwoods 219 5 268 10 343 16 558 26 500 23 
    To: 
Canada 396 9 716 25 750 34 1065 51 1025 48 
        Japan 2625 62 1729 61 1199 54 659 31 558 26 
        China:          
       ainlnd 362 9 20 1 10 1 52 3 127 6 
 
Source: Computed from: U.S. Timber Production, Trade, Consumption, and price Statistics, 1965 – 2005 
Research Paper RP-FPL-637 
96 
Table 11: Timber Damage Volume (million ft3) and Dollar Impacts of Six U.S. Hurricanes 
 
 
Camille 
1969 
Hugo 
1989 
Frances 
2004 
Ivan 
2004 
Katrina 
2005 
Rita 
2005 
TOTAL 
HURRICANES 
 
Softwood 
       South Carolina 0 1008 0 0 0 0 1008 
Florida 0 0 87 208 0 0 295 
Mississippi 216 0 0 0 619 0 835 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 287 296 583 
Alabama 0 0 0 603 126 0 729 
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 239 239 
Total Softwood 
      
3689 
       Hardwood 
       South Carolina 0 319 0 0 0 0 319 
Florida 0 0 58 94 0 0 152 
Mississippi 74 0 0 0 426 0 500 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 193 177 370 
Alabama 0 0 0 414 91 0 505 
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 293 293 
      
2139 
Total Timber (Softwood and Hardwood) 
South Carolina 0 1327 0 0 0 0 1327 
Florida 0 0 145 302 0 0 447 
Mississippi 290 0 0 0 1044 0 1334 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 480 473 953 
Alabama 0 0 0 1017 216 0 1233 
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 532 532 
290 1327 145 1319 1740 1005 5826 
       
        Softwood portion of 
damaged volume Percent 
      74 76 60 61 54 53 
 
        Study States: 
Percent of 
damage 
       Softwood 100 100 100 100 100 55 94 
Hardwood 100 100 100 100 100 37.66 86 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 47.07 91 
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Timber value damaged  (Price x 
Quantity) (Millions of 2005 dollars) 
     Sawtimber value 
lost 177 494 153 2094 1600 504 5022 
Pulpwood value 
lost 25 136 9 83 113 32 398 
All products 202 630 162 2177 1713 536 5420 
Total 404 1260 324 4354 3426 1072 10840 
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Table 12: ADF Unit Roots Tests 
 
 
LEVELS FIRST DIFFERENCES 
MACKINNON 
CRITICAL VALUES 
 
REGION PST PPW CNS PST PPW CNS 0.01 0.05 0.1 
 
AL1 -0.857 -2.501 -1.015 -5.55 -6.572 -5.548 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
AL2 -1.561 -2.565 -0.822 -5.945 -6.004 -6.042 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
AR1 -1.697 -3.314 -1.927 -5.813 -6.475 -6.184 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
AR2 -1.292 -3.052 
 
-5.438 -6.054 
 
-4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
FL1 -1.422 -2.202 -0.386 -5.874 -4.558 -5.026 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
FL2 -1.604 -1.862 -0.429 -5.527 -5.122 -5.786 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
GA1 -0.67 -2.313 -0.433 -5.465 -6.291 -5.717 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
GA2 -0.055 -2.475 0.212 -5.536 -5.043 -6.033 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
LA1 -1.695 -3.229 -1.616 -5.159 -5.074 -3.516 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
LA2 -1.728 -2.606 -1.614 -5.491 -6.004 -4.49 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
MS1 -1.339 -3.4 -0.715 -5.14 -7.369 -5.514 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
MS2 -1.83 -3.228 -1.642 -6.43 -5.498 -6.459 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
SC1 -1.352 -2.571 -1.74 -6.43 -5.258 -5.733 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
SC2 -0.963 -2.424 -0.985 -5.962 -6.666 -5.784 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 
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Table 13: Mean Growth Rates of Prices by Period 
 
 
1976q4 to 1982q2 2004q3 to 2009q2 1982q3 to 2004q3 
 
Region PST CNS PPW PST CNS PPW PST CNS PPW 
          AL1 0.016 0.024 0.014 -0.015 -0.016 0.005 0.011 0.008 0.003 
AL2 0.015 0.011 0.016 -0.014 -0.013 0.01 0.009 0.007 0.001 
AR1 0.013 0.005 0.02 -0.019 -0.017 0.012 0.009 0.01 0.002 
AR2 0.015 Na 0.016 -0.016 na 0.009 0.009 na 0.002 
FL1 0.014 0.014 0.019 -0.013 -0.018 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.002 
FL2 0.02 0.02 0.015 -0.006 -0.012 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.001 
GA1 0.018 0.022 0.01 -0.016 -0.015 -0.002 0.012 0.007 0.005 
GA2 0.013 0.005 0.018 -0.014 -0.016 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.002 
LA1 0.012 0.005 0.025 -0.025 -0.019 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.004 
LA2 0.016 0.012 0.015 -0.005 -0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.003 
MS1 0.017 0.011 0.014 -0.01 -0.012 0.009 0.01 0.008 0.004 
MS2 0.019 0.011 0.014 -0.009 -0.004 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.002 
SC1 0.014 0.03 0.009 -0.007 -0.002 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.004 
SC2 0.012 0.006 0.016 -0.009 -0.005 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.003 
 
AVERAGE 0.015 0.014 0.016 -0.013 -0.012 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.003 
 
Growth rates (Percentage changes in prices) are in decimals and not percentages 
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Table 14: Summary Statistics of Determinants of Market Integration and Others 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
CHI-SQUARE 
     
 
FOB Pricing 520 11.05519 10.98307 0 67.57 
Complete BPP 520 90.53215 104.3358 0.02 700.04 
Incomplete BPP 520 26.41923 24.2891 0.18 141.73 
Price Discrimination 520 6.875135 5.200201 0 32.1 
      P-VALUES 
     
 
FOB Pricing 520 0.1092502 0.2120612 0 0.9829 
Complete BPP 520 0.0044438 0.0281078 0 0.3521 
Incomplete BPP 520 0.0403577 0.1235822 0 0.9134 
Price Discrimination 520 0.2698231 0.2672421 0 0.9985 
      CONCENTRATION 
     
 
Concentration: 1983 520 3758.953 2517.813 1083.577 10000 
Concentration: 2004 520 4154.435 2735.666 1142.39 10000 
All Period Concentration 520 3956.694 2493.503 1112.984 10000 
      VOLUME 
     
 
Total Timber 520 83600000 52100000 8477010 200000000 
Total Softwood Timber 520 59500000 39200000 4752927 160000000 
Volume Total Wood 520 83600000 52100000 8477010 0 
Volume Softwood 520 59500000 39200000 4752927 60000000 
Distance: Home and Away 520 427.8173 209.2253 63 892 
      PRICING BHVR ACCEPTED 
     
 
FOB Pricing 520 34 
 
10 60 
Complete Basing Point Pricing 520 4 
 
0 9 
Incomplete BPP 520 26 
 
20 33 
Price Discrimination 520 36 
 
35 37 
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Table 15: CNS Pricing Behavior Tests 
 
REGION 
HOME(Y) 
REGION 
AWAY(X) FOB Price Discrim Incomplete BPP Complete BPP 
 
  
Wald 
Stat 
P-
Value 
Wald 
Stat 
P-
Value 
Wald 
Stat 
P-
Value 
Wald 
Stat 
P-
Value 
 
AL1 AL2 8.85 0.0029 5.89 0.2072 16.61 0.0002 66.92 0 
AL1 AR1 10.38 0.0013 10.67 0.0305 36.42 0 57.25 0 
AL1 FL1 0.96 0.3273 11.86 0.0184 1.54 0.4627 19.4 0.007 
AL1 FL2 18.9 0 8.01 0.0912 44.39 0 74.72 0 
AL1 GA1 3.95 0.0468 6.33 0.1755 10.12 0.0063 78.62 0 
AL1 GA2 4.83 0.028 2.53 0.6389 14.85 0.0006 48.37 0 
AL1 LA1 9.22 0.0024 1.44 0.8378 35.3 0 128.84 0 
AL1 LA2 10.87 0.001 5.57 0.2334 19.11 0.0001 98.26 0 
AL1 MS1 5.66 0.0173 9.17 0.0569 10.19 0.0061 46.79 0 
AL1 MS2 9.71 0.0018 4.21 0.3785 21.9 0 35.33 0 
AL1 SC1 5.58 0.0182 4.75 0.314 12.02 0.0025 34.92 0 
AL1 SC2 7.05 0.0079 4.04 0.4002 17.22 0.0002 56.06 0 
AL2 AL1 0.94 0.333 20.75 0.0004 5.47 0.0649 120.13 0 
AL2 AR1 37.08 0 5.5 0.2396 73.37 0 136.22 0 
AL2 FL1 2.85 0.0912 3.62 0.46 4.06 0.1311 54.82 0 
AL2 FL2 25.05 0 10.4 0.0341 25.05 0 84.26 0 
AL2 GA1 12.09 0.0005 0.48 0.9755 26.34 0 102.34 0 
AL2 GA2 25.18 0 11.63 0.0203 25.39 0 82.69 0 
AL2 LA1 11.6 0.0007 6.95 0.1386 28.45 0 179.64 0 
AL2 LA2 44.12 0 7.85 0.0974 75.4 0 206.59 0 
AL2 MS1 23.39 0 2.13 0.711 24.54 0 67.03 0 
AL2 MS2 14.33 0.0002 6.89 0.1419 14.46 0.0007 86.34 0 
AL2 SC1 12.09 0.0005 3.16 0.5316 17.83 0.0001 168.88 0 
AL2 SC2 14.66 0.0001 12.31 0.0152 24.56 0 52.49 0 
AR1 AL1 0 0.979 6.49 0.1654 3.01 0.2224 24.09 0.0011 
AR1 AL2 6.22 0.0126 4.3 0.3667 17.57 0.0002 52.52 0 
AR1 FL1 7.88 0.005 10.36 0.0348 30.74 0 43.89 0 
AR1 FL2 0.4 0.5279 15.28 0.0042 0.57 0.7513 16.93 0.0179 
AR1 GA1 0.36 0.5472 1.43 0.8386 11.75 0.0028 45.18 0 
AR1 GA2 1 0.3169 2.82 0.5886 2.69 0.26 15.2 0.0335 
AR1 LA1 0.69 0.4059 9.11 0.0583 11.51 0.0032 73.98 0 
AR1 LA2 10.65 0.0011 12.82 0.0122 19.48 0.0001 36.69 0 
AR1 MS1 9.43 0.0021 3.4 0.4926 16.2 0.0003 33.92 0 
AR1 MS2 0.01 0.9286 30.49 0 5.81 0.0548 57.71 0 
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AR1 SC1 0.74 0.3884 2.19 0.7012 11.18 0.0037 25.95 0.0005 
AR1 SC2 9.55 0.002 7.65 0.1054 11.75 0.0028 15.44 0.0086 
FL1 AL1 2.12 0.1451 6.78 0.1481 5.87 0.0531 27.11 0.0003 
FL1 AL2 10.11 0.0015 6.37 0.1733 24.91 0 95.92 0 
FL1 AR1 67.57 0 7.19 0.1262 141.73 0 166.63 0 
FL1 FL2 3.02 0.0822 18.23 0.0011 5.37 0.0683 23.24 0.0015 
FL1 GA1 3.57 0.0589 2.02 0.7319 33.65 0 107 0 
FL1 GA2 5.63 0.0176 0.42 0.9808 9.79 0.0075 45.37 0 
FL1 LA1 17.85 0 3.02 0.5546 69.04 0 256.98 0 
FL1 LA2 16.9 0 6.37 0.173 23.62 0 44.27 0 
FL1 MS1 21.07 0 5.97 0.2013 26.85 0 88.87 0 
FL1 MS2 5.38 0.0203 3.66 0.4543 18.48 0.0001 78.48 0 
FL1 SC1 10.9 0.001 3.12 0.5381 41.03 0 85.04 0 
FL1 SC2 18.16 0 5.33 0.2555 18.64 0.0001 16.47 0.0056 
FL2 AL1 30.96 0 11.68 0.0199 45.5 0 161.19 0 
FL2 AL2 8.14 0.0043 5.9 0.2069 70.93 0 163.09 0 
FL2 AR1 7.99 0.0047 16.82 0.0021 68.16 0 97.22 0 
FL2 FL1 5.25 0.022 15.17 0.0044 5.35 0.069 25.23 0.0007 
FL2 GA1 6.31 0.012 2.51 0.6422 17.93 0.0001 83.2 0 
FL2 GA2 0.03 0.8682 7.09 0.1313 13.2 0.0014 57.07 0 
FL2 LA1 25.3 0 6.22 0.1831 75.99 0 269.12 0 
FL2 LA2 2.94 0.0867 3.48 0.4811 36.61 0 101.03 0 
FL2 MS1 0.08 0.7748 10.62 0.0311 12.73 0.0017 59.89 0 
FL2 MS2 23.65 0 3.57 0.467 32.04 0 79.01 0 
FL2 SC1 16.11 0.0001 4.52 0.3405 25.24 0 58.01 0 
FL2 SC2 0.41 0.5215 6.09 0.1925 3.59 0.166 17.91 0.0031 
GA1 AL1 22.12 0 6.32 0.1765 24.58 0 106.3 0 
GA1 AL2 25.71 0 2.18 0.702 37.51 0 114.24 0 
GA1 AR1 43.09 0 7.57 0.1085 69.15 0 155.93 0 
GA1 FL1 19.82 0 0.3 0.9901 19.85 0 106.55 0 
GA1 FL2 23.82 0 6.32 0.1763 24.55 0 81.08 0 
GA1 GA2 0.03 0.8645 2.38 0.6666 1.3 0.5215 68.75 0 
GA1 LA1 34.3 0 16.09 0.0029 51.69 0 493.41 0 
GA1 LA2 26.87 0 3.07 0.5459 27.82 0 116.86 0 
GA1 MS1 24.42 0 4.51 0.3414 30.99 0 103.44 0 
GA1 MS2 30.89 0 12.58 0.0135 60.35 0 113.72 0 
GA1 SC1 28.07 0 8.22 0.0837 41.23 0 104.49 0 
GA1 SC2 14.06 0.0002 30.99 0 14.33 0.0008 96.65 0 
GA2 AL1 28.8 0 13.3 0.0099 78.43 0 109.63 0 
GA2 AL2 18.04 0 5.04 0.2833 32.23 0 229.55 0 
GA2 AR1 36.78 0 7.52 0.1107 100.52 0 145.26 0 
GA2 FL1 9.69 0.0019 5.27 0.2602 11.21 0.0037 76.2 0 
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GA2 FL2 32.1 0 11.72 0.0196 40.23 0 104.8 0 
GA2 GA1 7.6 0.0058 23.05 0.0001 10.22 0.006 116.35 0 
GA2 LA1 49.56 0 4.06 0.3975 133.35 0 347.16 0 
GA2 LA2 21.84 0 1.75 0.7818 75.48 0 117.02 0 
GA2 MS1 28.13 0 4.5 0.3431 38.71 0 68.21 0 
GA2 MS2 35.37 0 8.02 0.0909 38.86 0 112.77 0 
GA2 SC1 24.82 0 9.7 0.0457 34.31 0 93.48 0 
GA2 SC2 33.35 0 12.51 0.014 95.59 0 131.51 0 
LA1 AL1 8.45 0.0037 3.62 0.4606 10.66 0.0049 90.14 0 
LA1 AL2 11.24 0.0008 6.93 0.1398 12.39 0.002 127.35 0 
LA1 AR1 22.09 0 10.73 0.0298 36.29 0 78.07 0 
LA1 FL1 7.23 0.0072 0.11 0.9985 8.24 0.0162 95.81 0 
LA1 FL2 18.98 0 0.13 0.998 20.68 0 98.92 0 
LA1 GA1 7.05 0.0079 0.65 0.9579 9.05 0.0108 129.25 0 
LA1 LA1 8.01 0.0046 7.77 0.1002 28.37 0 115.31 0 
LA1 LA2 7.06 0.0079 12.95 0.0115 7.74 0.0209 52.65 0 
LA1 MS1 9.08 0.0026 1.77 0.7778 9.52 0.0086 114.35 0 
LA1 MS2 6.65 0.0099 5.95 0.2026 7.05 0.0294 52.36 0 
LA1 SC1 7.3 0.0069 3.28 0.5122 27.86 0 100.46 0 
LA1 SC2 10.5 0.0012 4.6 0.3305 11.45 0.0033 52.8 0 
LA2 AL1 16.94 0 7.46 0.1134 40.15 0 145.77 0 
LA2 AL2 19.34 0 2.49 0.6473 53.49 0 114.39 0 
LA2 AR1 30.2 0 6.83 0.1451 131.1 0 183.87 0 
LA2 FL1 3.69 0.0547 3.23 0.5202 5.44 0.0659 38.38 0 
LA2 FL2 20.86 0 2.05 0.7269 31.91 0 55.4 0 
LA2 GA1 1.99 0.1579 5.52 0.238 17.08 0.0002 71 0 
LA2 GA2 3.93 0.0475 8.15 0.0862 4.63 0.0989 29.69 0.0001 
LA2 LA1 7.54 0.006 11.16 0.0249 51.69 0 195.32 0 
LA2 MS1 4.99 0.0254 8.29 0.0816 32.02 0 54.44 0 
LA2 MS2 16.71 0 2.18 0.7029 18.47 0.0001 54.29 0 
LA2 SC1 15.12 0.0001 4.65 0.3253 32.66 0 65.69 0 
LA2 SC2 15.26 0.0001 13.88 0.0077 48.99 0 86.23 0 
MS1 AL1 6.28 0.0122 6.45 0.1678 10.44 0.0054 84.01 0 
MS1 AL2 26.65 0 1.43 0.8392 75.77 0 123.4 0 
MS1 AR1 27.11 0 2.94 0.5683 88.3 0 224.68 0 
MS1 FL1 15.9 0.0001 7.15 0.1284 37 0 95.31 0 
MS1 FL2 25.56 0 1.65 0.7995 28.02 0 100.9 0 
MS1 GA1 5.31 0.0212 3.22 0.5218 37.15 0 146.54 0 
MS1 GA2 10.29 0.0013 4.98 0.289 30.91 0 74.64 0 
MS1 LA1 27.43 0 4.78 0.3104 73.5 0 276.78 0 
MS1 LA2 32.74 0 8.79 0.0666 65.2 0 103.02 0 
MS1 MS2 1.19 0.2753 24.54 0.0001 3.27 0.1946 54.72 0 
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MS1 SC1 11.58 0.0007 14.06 0.0071 40.1 0 101.25 0 
MS1 SC2 23.66 0 5.46 0.2432 31.31 0 66.37 0 
MS2 AL1 19.33 0 6.2 0.1845 29.29 0 57.32 0 
MS2 AL2 16.82 0 1.42 0.8407 37.82 0 123.53 0 
MS2 AR1 42.38 0 4.18 0.3822 71.79 0 257.21 0 
MS2 FL1 10.84 0.001 12.27 0.0155 11.32 0.0035 71.28 0 
MS2 FL2 14.75 0.0001 3.35 0.5004 26.8 0 63.47 0 
MS2 GA1 29.79 0 11.47 0.0218 43.83 0 94.55 0 
MS2 GA2 0.94 0.3332 5.48 0.2416 9.81 0.0074 69.44 0 
MS2 LA1 44.23 0 22.08 0.0002 68.76 0 262.48 0 
MS2 LA2 7.33 0.0068 21.17 0.0003 22.2 0 139.18 0 
MS2 MS1 0.94 0.3314 24.66 0.0001 2.58 0.2754 38.85 0 
MS2 SC1 28.37 0 10.15 0.038 53.84 0 94.7 0 
MS2 SC2 1.06 0.3022 26.78 0 4.01 0.1348 96.59 0 
SC1 AL1 2.94 0.0866 2.71 0.608 6.12 0.0469 29.23 0.0001 
SC1 AL2 7.62 0.0058 7.61 0.1069 13.65 0.0011 80.84 0 
SC1 AR1 32.76 0 2.77 0.5972 77.88 0 129.83 0 
SC1 FL1 15.4 0.0001 3.81 0.4316 25.52 0 41.98 0 
SC1 FL2 2.28 0.1311 9.15 0.0575 3.79 0.1504 21.28 0.0034 
SC1 GA1 6.71 0.0096 4.29 0.3679 28.36 0 48.19 0 
SC1 GA2 0.99 0.3201 4.65 0.3254 2.97 0.227 26.25 0.0005 
SC1 LA1 25.06 0 6.28 0.1794 54.36 0 172.91 0 
SC1 LA2 17.52 0 10.02 0.04 23.04 0 78.29 0 
SC1 MS1 7.14 0.0076 4.8 0.3088 12.46 0.002 49.29 0 
SC1 MS2 9.42 0.0022 2.95 0.567 18.92 0.0001 33.74 0 
SC1 SC2 1.13 0.2884 27.01 0 1.22 0.5421 17.59 0.0139 
SC2 AL1 0.69 0.4048 6.01 0.1987 17.21 0.0002 63.98 0 
SC2 AL2 18.65 0 6.95 0.1385 56.95 0 265.56 0 
SC2 AR1 21.03 0 5.79 0.2155 139.83 0 236.89 0 
SC2 FL1 0.06 0.8123 11.57 0.0209 20.39 0 53.56 0 
SC2 FL2 15.88 0.0001 8.03 0.0904 27.96 0 92.28 0 
SC2 GA1 2.79 0.0946 3.97 0.41 28.85 0 86.31 0 
SC2 GA2 41 0 32.1 0 55.64 0 73.14 0 
SC2 LA1 11.03 0.0009 10.35 0.0349 85.03 0 280.8 0 
SC2 LA2 38.95 0 7.9 0.0953 90.7 0 140.9 0 
SC2 MS1 22.51 0 4.89 0.2988 53.75 0 73.19 0 
SC2 MS2 5.01 0.0252 10.09 0.0389 18.84 0.0001 94.72 0 
SC2 SC1 0.03 0.8658 27.81 0 16.75 0.0002 51.17 0 
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Table 16: PPW Pricing Behavior Tests 
 
REGION 
HOME 
(Y) 
REGION 
AWAY 
(X) FOB Price Discrim Incomplete BPP Complete BPP 
 
  
Wald-
Stat 
P-
Value 
Wald-
Stat 
P-
Value 
Wald-
Stat 
P-
Value 
Wald-
Stat 
P-
Value 
 
AL1 AL2 0.01 0.9032 10.29 0.0357 7.77 0.0205 46.48 0 
AL1 AR1 12.12 0.0005 2.91 0.5738 36.3 0 209.29 0 
AL1 AR2 9.75 0.0018 1.06 0.9003 16.58 0.0003 60.42 0 
AL1 FL1 17.11 0 8.95 0.0622 20.15 0 68.56 0 
AL1 FL2 3.49 0.0617 1.87 0.7601 5.03 0.0808 37.04 0 
AL1 GA1 0.44 0.5082 2.49 0.6466 7.7 0.0213 89.87 0 
AL1 GA2 7.49 0.0062 4.65 0.3248 18.52 0.0001 99.64 0 
AL1 LA1 12.69 0.0004 4.16 0.3845 22.28 0 77.55 0 
AL1 LA2 28.57 0 7.86 0.0968 30.36 0 334.66 0 
AL1 MS1 7.73 0.0054 3.66 0.4542 31.74 0 96.06 0 
AL1 MS2 8.09 0.0044 4.34 0.3625 22.62 0 59.58 0 
AL1 SC1 4.85 0.0277 10.23 0.0368 10.77 0.0046 52.19 0 
AL1 SC2 1.75 0.186 6.44 0.1688 12.07 0.0024 73.79 0 
AL2 AL1 8.65 0.0033 9.49 0.05 26.66 0 126.58 0 
AL2 AR1 3.3 0.0692 4.01 0.4053 39.07 0 178.69 0 
AL2 AR2 14.12 0.0002 3.28 0.5124 38.17 0 75.43 0 
AL2 FL1 3 0.083 13.14 0.0106 4.43 0.1089 32.9 0 
AL2 FL2 41.73 0 4.94 0.293 46.66 0 90.58 0 
AL2 GA1 2.43 0.1194 7.13 0.1294 19.61 0.0001 92.54 0 
AL2 GA2 6.22 0.0126 5.65 0.227 17.7 0.0001 80.73 0 
AL2 LA1 4.93 0.0264 16.22 0.0027 17.47 0.0002 36.82 0 
AL2 LA2 17.03 0 10.44 0.0336 22.71 0 523.06 0 
AL2 MS1 3.81 0.0508 1.03 0.9054 41.88 0 59.54 0 
AL2 MS2 13.51 0.0002 4.29 0.3685 50.5 0 141.7 0 
AL2 SC1 6.06 0.0138 11.74 0.0194 20.48 0 33.77 0 
AL2 SC2 11.74 0.0006 8.03 0.0905 0.4 0 12.33 0.0305 
AR1 AL1 2.25 0.1336 7.44 0.1142 4.54 0.1032 60.04 0 
AR1 AL2 3.27 0.0704 8.41 0.0777 6.77 0.0339 26.06 0.0005 
AR1 AR2 1.91 0.1667 15.47 0.0038 2.18 0.3363 18.77 0.0089 
AR1 FL1 0.26 0.6106 13.31 0.0098 22.72 0 48.65 0 
AR1 FL2 0.27 0.6 2.15 0.7089 5.69 0.0581 22.91 0.0018 
AR1 GA1 3.89 0.0487 7.53 0.1106 19.17 0.0001 77.37 0 
AR1 GA2 1.22 0.2686 6.72 0.1517 1.3 0.5218 38.25 0 
AR1 LA1 0.25 0.617 22.62 0.0002 1.52 0.4676 11.65 0.1127 
106 
AR1 LA2 14.88 0.0001 4.95 0.2928 17.14 0.0002 104.16 0 
AR1 MS1 0.25 0.6157 2.54 0.637 9.67 0.008 19.69 0.0063 
AR1 MS2 3.9 0.0482 4.12 0.3898 9.87 0.0072 44.34 0 
AR1 SC1 2.31 0.1285 4.15 0.3855 6.72 0.0348 14.41 0.0444 
AR1 SC2 4.9 0.0269 8.65 0.0704 5.88 0.0528 8.11 0.15 
AR2 AL1 5.35 0.0207 7.67 0.1043 7.86 0.0196 28.29 0.0002 
AR2 AL2 0.01 0.9243 11.99 0.0174 0.65 0.7243 15.75 0.0275 
AR2 AR1 0.42 0.5185 18.58 0.0009 7.99 0.0184 38.24 0 
AR2 FL1 0.2 0.6587 7.81 0.0988 0.39 0.8242 10.06 0.1852 
AR2 FL2 1.67 0.1967 2.43 0.6563 1.68 0.4315 11.74 0.1094 
AR2 GA1 0.43 0.5126 3.22 0.5213 4.66 0.0972 28.31 0.0002 
AR2 GA2 8.79 0.003 12.39 0.0147 21.34 0 49.34 0 
AR2 LA1 7.71 0.0055 10.29 0.0358 13.95 0.0009 54.56 0 
AR2 LA2 9.47 0.0021 9.74 0.045 16.13 0.0003 178.28 0 
AR2 MS1 2.3 0.129 5.08 0.2796 6.96 0.0307 25.46 0.0006 
AR2 MS2 1.21 0.271 6.41 0.1709 17.03 0.0002 52.66 0 
AR2 SC1 4.11 0.0427 5.58 0.2327 5.01 0.0816 32.08 0 
AR2 SC2 4.84 0.0278 9.53 0.0491 16.44 0.0003 17.36 0.0039 
FL1 AL1 3.29 0.0696 1.94 0.7461 28.42 0 72.8 0 
FL1 AL2 10.44 0.0012 13.73 0.0082 10.46 0.0054 29.47 0.0001 
FL1 AR1 36.15 0 12.45 0.0143 21.51 0 178.07 0 
FL1 AR2 11.6 0.0007 6.93 0.1394 44.42 0 104.08 0 
FL1 FL2 0.06 0.8103 24.37 0.0001 4.65 0.0978 27.72 0.0002 
FL1 GA1 16.95 0 4.03 0.4015 32.39 0 164.84 0 
FL1 GA2 2.21 0.1367 15.78 0.0033 8.03 0.018 112.41 0 
FL1 LA1 6.79 0.0092 3.25 0.517 23.74 0 70.69 0 
FL1 LA2 20.79 0 16.38 0.0026 25.8 0 567.84 0 
FL1 MS1 16.92 0 2.51 0.6426 36.55 0 125.87 0 
FL1 MS2 6.31 0.012 0.32 0.9883 48.82 0 127.79 0 
FL1 SC1 14.08 0.0002 12.78 0.0124 35.93 0 82.78 0 
FL1 SC2 6.65 0.0099 7.51 0.1113 20.87 0 31.63 0 
FL2 AL1 8.76 0.0031 3.78 0.4372 29.69 0 87.99 0 
FL2 AL2 19.75 0 14.88 0.0049 87.23 0 189.63 0 
FL2 AR1 17.94 0 7.2 0.1255 89.93 0 150.17 0 
FL2 AR2 20.3 0 0.85 0.9312 48.07 0 115.26 0 
FL2 FL1 10.5 0.0012 18.9 0.0008 16.23 0.0003 69.09 0 
FL2 GA1 18.67 0 8.99 0.0613 18.67 0.0001 142.13 0 
FL2 GA2 2.18 0.1402 16 0.003 18.37 0.0001 121.95 0 
FL2 LA1 4.1 0.0428 20.76 0.0004 24.04 0 75.05 0 
FL2 LA2 29.88 0 12.14 0.0164 80.98 0 633.54 0 
FL2 MS1 6.75 0.0094 1.94 0.7464 30.23 0 58.98 0 
FL2 MS2 24.12 0 6.96 0.1383 62.23 0 205 0 
FL2 SC1 7.87 0.005 7.06 0.133 22.52 0 45.54 0 
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FL2 SC2 15.46 0.0001 12.41 0.0145 73.89 0 24.82 0.0002 
GA1 AL1 9.1 0.0026 10.23 0.0367 11.06 0.004 138.14 0 
GA1 AL2 35.75 0 9.48 0.0502 38.69 0 88.53 0 
GA1 AR1 50.72 0 6.39 0.1718 23.4 0 251.48 0 
GA1 AR2 30.48 0 6.32 0.1762 34.61 0 97.64 0 
GA1 FL1 9.79 0.0018 6.31 0.1772 23.99 0 106.66 0 
GA1 FL2 1.71 0.1908 5.79 0.2153 2.9 0.2345 60.98 0 
GA1 GA2 6.84 0.0089 14.91 0.0049 7.19 0.0275 82.23 0 
GA1 LA1 11.22 0.0008 24.82 0.0001 12.89 0.0016 58.17 0 
GA1 LA2 48.48 0 16.61 0.0023 48.49 0 397.87 0 
GA1 MS1 13.25 0.0003 10.79 0.0291 37 0 100.05 0 
GA1 MS2 9.43 0.0021 8.1 0.0881 25.86 0 99.4 0 
GA1 SC1 14.63 0.0001 14.84 0.005 16.06 0.0003 61.04 0 
GA1 SC2 24.99 0 1.86 0.762 25.9 0 58.27 0 
GA2 AL1 12.26 0.0005 3.44 0.4877 22.42 0 139.49 0 
GA2 AL2 0.64 0.4247 5.53 0.2369 13.5 0.0012 59.75 0 
GA2 AR1 8.42 0.0037 10.13 0.0383 66.92 0 301.61 0 
GA2 AR2 14.44 0.0001 10.73 0.0297 80.47 0 135.69 0 
GA2 FL1 2.47 0.1163 7.27 0.1225 4.63 0.0986 95.26 0 
GA2 FL2 15.15 0.0001 14.19 0.0067 15.18 0.0005 66.35 0 
GA2 GA1 0.13 0.7211 11.41 0.0223 5.13 0.0768 84.5 0 
GA2 LA1 20.14 0 6.76 0.1489 65.21 0 132.92 0 
GA2 LA2 24.46 0 12.34 0.015 24.55 0 476 0 
GA2 MS1 13.61 0.0002 12.86 0.012 40.73 0 117.74 0 
GA2 MS2 8.04 0.0046 10.87 0.028 41.99 0 135.75 0 
GA2 SC1 11.64 0.0006 4.74 0.3151 18.86 0.0001 68.9 0 
GA2 SC2 18.29 0 0.43 0.9801 36.65 0 68.21 0 
LA1 AL1 6.04 0.014 6.94 0.1392 12.34 0.0021 26.46 0.0004 
LA1 AL2 1.47 0.2258 7.7 0.1034 4.31 0.1161 10.49 0.1623 
LA1 AR1 0.68 0.4096 3.73 0.4431 13.53 0.0012 34.02 0 
LA1 AR2 5.25 0.022 8.94 0.0626 14.72 0.0006 38.38 0 
LA1 FL1 1.41 0.2358 7.9 0.0953 2.07 0.3546 9.85 0.1973 
LA1 FL2 2.83 0.0922 3.85 0.427 4.79 0.0911 10.51 0.1617 
LA1 GA1 3.61 0.0576 12.6 0.0134 4.21 0.1221 22.84 0.0018 
LA1 LA1 6.92 0.0085 9.44 0.051 20.48 0 53.69 0 
LA1 LA2 7.58 0.0059 8.87 0.0644 10.56 0.0051 96.97 0 
LA1 MS1 0.58 0.4444 8.27 0.0823 4.55 0.1026 21.15 0.0036 
LA1 MS2 3.43 0.0641 7.62 0.1064 10.34 0.0057 33.66 0 
LA1 SC1 4.23 0.0397 8.37 0.0788 4.85 0.0884 23 0.0017 
LA1 SC2 2.44 0.1181 2.35 0.6708 6.16 0.046 13.17 0.0681 
LA2 AL1 0.39 0.5347 4.51 0.3419 86.6 0 587.69 0 
LA2 AL2 1.68 0.1953 4.18 0.3824 67.4 0 676.56 0 
LA2 AR1 0.08 0.7765 5.62 0.2293 3.83 0 670.3 0 
108 
LA2 AR2 0.39 0.5341 2.64 0.6201 36.56 0 700.04 0 
LA2 FL1 1.24 0.2653 12.11 0.0166 31.16 0 283 0 
LA2 FL2 1.52 0.2179 12.86 0.012 31.08 0 422.24 0 
LA2 GA1 1.78 0.1826 6.31 0.1773 72.33 0 503.62 0 
LA2 GA2 2.21 0.1371 5.1 0.277 10.91 0 645.63 0 
LA2 LA1 5.36 0.0206 13.78 0.008 58.53 0 47.2 0 
LA2 MS1 1.14 0.2852 4.41 0.3531 51.54 0 597.2 0 
LA2 MS2 0.1 0.7488 10.55 0.0322 98.7 0 614.54 0 
LA2 SC1 0.56 0.4549 3.03 0.5526 10.65 0 346.16 0 
LA2 SC2 0 0.9829 4.36 0.3593 2.01 0 586.09 0 
MS1 AL1 0.17 0.6812 13.3 0.0099 21.62 0 150.8 0 
MS1 AL2 11.73 0.0006 6.03 0.1967 16.43 0.0003 58.75 0 
MS1 AR1 20.24 0 3.17 0.5301 1.38 0 222.78 0 
MS1 AR2 19.35 0 17.17 0.0018 43.64 0 116.83 0 
MS1 FL1 0.85 0.3557 13.86 0.0078 36.66 0 126.4 0 
MS1 FL2 1.15 0.2831 3.08 0.5449 3.28 0.1942 32.51 0 
MS1 GA1 9.94 0.0016 6.01 0.1983 19.78 0.0001 86.84 0 
MS1 GA2 7.25 0.0071 7.26 0.1227 17.87 0.0001 105.56 0 
MS1 LA1 3.78 0.0518 13.46 0.0093 15.24 0.0005 101.65 0 
MS1 LA2 17.86 0 20.02 0.0005 19.26 0.0001 379.19 0 
MS1 MS2 0.05 0.8242 16.34 0.0026 16.22 0.0003 57.65 0 
MS1 SC1 8.21 0.0042 10.41 0.034 34.19 0 96.05 0 
MS1 SC2 7.65 0.0057 7.78 0.1001 25.12 0 85.62 0 
MS2 AL1 16.85 0 20.07 0.0005 16.89 0.0002 79.21 0 
MS2 AL2 1.97 0.1602 7.05 0.1334 15.07 0.0005 77.69 0 
MS2 AR1 23.24 0 3.78 0.4367 48.65 0 138.86 0 
MS2 AR2 10.81 0.001 6.17 0.187 36.98 0 144.35 0 
MS2 FL1 6.56 0.0104 7.86 0.0968 7.2 0.0273 70.33 0 
MS2 FL2 6.56 0.0104 5.56 0.2346 21.98 0 79.15 0 
MS2 GA1 4.5 0.0339 5.78 0.2159 4.79 0.0911 138.06 0 
MS2 GA2 5.18 0.0228 9.2 0.0562 5.72 0.0573 56.06 0 
MS2 LA1 20.48 0 5.35 0.2535 22.51 0 145.39 0 
MS2 LA2 41.51 0 3.39 0.494 42.73 0 327.51 0 
MS2 MS1 10.25 0.0014 31.44 0 13.15 0.0014 69.84 0 
MS2 SC1 21.04 0 0.86 0.9304 25.11 0 79.51 0 
MS2 SC2 21.95 0 8.8 0.0662 68.91 0 109.25 0 
SC1 AL1 3.9 0.0482 9.06 0.0597 12.25 0.0022 96.66 0 
SC1 AL2 1.01 0.3155 4.48 0.3444 1.76 0.4151 20.24 0.0051 
SC1 AR1 16.33 0.0001 6.1 0.1915 78.8 0 143.63 0 
SC1 AR2 5.86 0.0155 0.53 0.971 26.54 0 76.83 0 
SC1 FL1 0.3 0.5865 3.44 0.4866 10.74 0.0047 26.21 0.0005 
SC1 FL2 0.4 0.5249 1.25 0.8699 3.66 0.1607 26.34 0.0004 
SC1 GA1 1.13 0.2871 3.34 0.5033 13.65 0.0011 98.97 0 
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SC1 GA2 3.44 0.0636 2.95 0.5657 6.02 0.0494 31.67 0 
SC1 LA1 6.81 0.0091 4.17 0.3831 13.04 0.0015 100.23 0 
SC1 LA2 14.84 0.0001 3.63 0.4591 17.06 0.0002 269.03 0 
SC1 MS1 11.79 0.0006 14.86 0.005 51.77 0 107.47 0 
SC1 MS2 0.17 0.6812 16.46 0.0025 12.27 0.0022 48.23 0 
SC1 SC2 5.83 0.0158 12.5 0.014 6.15 0.0463 14.27 0.0465 
SC2 AL1 2.1 0.1471 2.43 0.6565 8.96 0.0113 35.5 0 
SC2 AL2 1.4 0.2371 2.53 0.6395 12.86 0.0016 29.59 0.0001 
SC2 AR1 1.64 0.2001 3.35 0.5017 19.26 0.0001 51.5 0 
SC2 AR2 6.89 0.0087 3.3 0.5083 43.55 0 78.02 0 
SC2 FL1 2.26 0.1329 3.15 0.5323 2.26 0.3232 23.26 0.0015 
SC2 FL2 1.3 0.2551 5.22 0.2651 2.86 0.2388 28.11 0.0002 
SC2 GA1 1.04 0.3088 5.84 0.2115 4.58 0.1013 33.7 0 
SC2 GA2 3.64 0.0565 2.55 0.6362 16.3 0.0003 31.91 0 
SC2 LA1 2.68 0.1014 12.14 0.0163 14.43 0.0007 45.26 0 
SC2 LA2 13.95 0.0002 4.03 0.4025 15.82 0.0004 210.13 0 
SC2 MS1 2.1 0.1468 5.91 0.2058 13.47 0.0012 37.91 0 
SC2 MS2 19.63 0 6.15 0.1881 47.34 0 88.57 0 
SC2 SC1 0.01 0.9394 11.03 0.0262 1.18 0.5543 7.78 0.3521 
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Table 17: PST Pricing Behavior Tests 
 
REGION 
HOME 
(Y) 
REGION 
AWAY 
(X) FOB 
Price 
Discrimination Incomplete BPP  Complete BPP 
 
  
Wald 
Stat P-value 
Wald 
Stat P-value 
Wald 
Stat P-value 
Wald 
Stat P-value 
 
AL1 AL2 3.51 0.0611 5.93 0.2041 6.15 0.0461 54.88 0 
AL1 AR1 2.3 0.1295 9.24 0.0554 4.67 0.097 56.18 0 
AL1 AR2 23.38 0 7.78 0.1002 65.86 0 11.67 0 
AL1 FL1 12.27 0.0005 2.87 0.012 53.71 0 66.15 0 
AL1 FL2 0.12 0.7305 0.31 0.0356 1.2 0.5492 58.41 0 
AL1 GA1 5.14 0.0234 5.7 0.2231 14.11 0.0009 65.84 0 
AL1 GA2 7.62 0.0058 4.18 0.3821 21.59 0 52.86 0 
AL1 LA1 16.81 0 7.93 0.0941 48.71 0 80.58 0 
AL1 LA2 4.35 0.037 6.5 0.165 24.14 0 44.58 0 
AL1 MS1 11.08 0.0009 3.02 0.5553 11.96 0.0025 62.58 0 
AL1 MS2 18.94 0 7.04 0.1339 49.79 0 12.56 0 
AL1 SC1 17.25 0 4.67 0.0054 27.19 0 89.2 0 
AL1 SC2 9.58 0.002 1.8 0.0189 16.01 0.0003 24.05 0 
AL2 AL1 3.46 0.0627 2.63 0.6217 4.15 0.1255 48.76 0 
AL2 AR1 7.78 0.0053 7.61 0.107 21.33 0 64.01 0 
AL2 AR2 16.66 0 2.98 0.5616 94.32 0 82.39 0 
AL2 FL1 10.87 0.001 6.97 0.1375 16.74 0.0002 54.91 0 
AL2 FL2 9.14 0.0025 2.02 0.7315 10.98 0.0041 43.17 0 
AL2 GA1 4 0.0455 1.44 0.8369 16.6 0.0002 37.52 0 
AL2 GA2 6.12 0.0134 1.27 0.8673 31.44 0 63.19 0 
AL2 LA1 3.63 0.0568 4.64 0.3261 12.69 0.0018 73.54 0 
AL2 LA2 8.35 0.0039 4 0.4055 36.06 0 89.19 0 
AL2 MS1 1.76 0.1848 6.3 0.1779 10.69 0.0048 63.95 0 
AL2 MS2 1.63 0.2021 8.99 0.0613 11.62 0.003 95.1 0 
AL2 SC1 9.3 0.0023 5.03 0.2839 28.06 0 70 0 
AL2 SC2 1.38 0.2404 7.8 0.0991 18.86 0.0001 22.32 0.0005 
AR1 AL1 0.34 0.5571 6.36 0.1738 1.14 0.5642 113.1 0 
AR1 AL2 3.01 0.0829 3.56 0.4692 3.11 0.2113 59.85 0 
AR1 AR2 10.43 0.0012 0.65 0.9574 31.02 0 83.47 0 
AR1 FL1 5.81 0.016 9.59 0.0478 6.85 0.0326 1.49 0 
AR1 FL2 16.53 0 7.09 0.1311 21.17 0 84.24 0 
AR1 GA1 7.31 0.0069 2.94 0.0116 9.1 0.0106 74.62 0 
AR1 GA2 11.3 0.0008 7.32 0.12 24.22 0 86.18 0 
AR1 LA1 3.33 0.0679 5.34 0 3.54 0.1705 0.23 0 
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AR1 LA2 16.28 0.0001 4.18 0.3825 18.35 0.0001 5.85 0 
AR1 MS1 10.55 0.0012 4.32 0.3642 19.75 0.0001 80.92 0 
AR1 MS2 2.39 0.1221 4.05 0.0071 2.74 0.2544 97.5 0 
AR1 SC1 17.25 0 0.94 0.9193 29.79 0 29.11 0 
AR1 SC2 9.3 0.0023 3.47 0.4821 23.6 0 64.14 0 
AR2 AL1 2.42 0.1196 1.25 0.8698 6.39 0.0409 19.72 0.0062 
AR2 AL2 1.48 0.2231 5.02 0.2857 1.52 0.4675 24.03 0.0011 
AR2 AR1 4.82 0.0281 8.84 0.0008 5.75 0.0564 63.43 0 
AR2 FL1 5.23 0.0222 4.57 0.3344 6.23 0.0445 20 0.0056 
AR2 FL2 0.12 0.7274 2.54 0.6375 0.18 0.9134 16 0.0251 
AR2 GA1 7.85 0.0051 3.12 0.5372 12.36 0.0021 27.47 0.0003 
AR2 GA2 17.14 0 3.76 0.439 18.75 0.0001 27.82 0.0002 
AR2 LA1 3.75 0.0529 2.86 0.5817 10.28 0.0059 24.94 0.0008 
AR2 LA2 1.47 0.2254 7.29 0.1216 12.57 0.0019 27.86 0.0002 
AR2 MS1 0.1 0.7521 5.85 0.211 0.54 0.7636 17.26 0.0158 
AR2 MS2 5.11 0.0238 1.15 0.887 9.67 0.008 30.83 0.0001 
AR2 SC1 0.03 0.8529 9.06 0.0596 2.28 0.3195 30.5 0.0001 
AR2 SC2 0.02 0.8979 3.47 0.4824 5.3 0.0705 8.72 0.1208 
FL1 AL1 7.68 0.0056 6.12 0.1906 15.54 0.0004 60.64 0 
FL1 AL2 1.74 0.1876 3.88 0.4221 4.33 0.115 16.81 0.0186 
FL1 AR1 0.05 0.8209 1.07 0.0258 7.01 0.0301 82.96 0 
FL1 AR2 7.15 0.0075 0.72 0.0299 28.5 0 61.95 0 
FL1 FL2 3.75 0.0527 5.58 0 3.92 0.1411 19.07 0.008 
FL1 GA1 8.09 0.0045 7.11 0.0018 8.5 0.0142 44.77 0 
FL1 GA2 2.45 0.1174 5.32 0.256 7.51 0.0234 20.4 0.0048 
FL1 LA1 15.34 0.0001 1.98 0.0175 47.31 0 90 0 
FL1 LA2 4.18 0.0409 3.73 0.4443 27.99 0 69.32 0 
FL1 MS1 0.77 0.3789 7.16 0.1276 1.78 0.4097 49.46 0 
FL1 MS2 8.74 0.0031 2.71 0.0128 32.76 0 60.58 0 
FL1 SC1 2.93 0.0869 0.36 0.0348 12.96 0.0015 58.62 0 
FL1 SC2 0.4 0.5271 4.89 0.2992 6.6 0.0368 5.98 0.3081 
FL2 AL1 8.07 0.0045 2.99 0.56 8.59 0.0136 82.22 0 
FL2 AL2 6.81 0.0091 3.04 0.5505 17.28 0.0002 74.66 0 
FL2 AR1 14.92 0.0001 5.95 0.2029 50.93 0 70.34 0 
FL2 AR2 30.19 0 0.34 0.035 86.22 0 15.32 0 
FL2 FL1 25.72 0 3.86 0.0077 37.13 0 55.32 0 
FL2 GA1 6.16 0.0131 4.55 0.0057 45.08 0 45.45 0 
FL2 GA2 10.37 0.0013 6.16 0.1875 15.58 0.0004 55.02 0 
FL2 LA1 3.04 0.0814 1.15 0.0249 10.54 0.0051 37.12 0 
FL2 LA2 13.94 0.0002 9.44 0.0509 28.5 0 57.47 0 
FL2 MS1 9.65 0.0019 6.69 0.0022 43.65 0 1.01 0 
FL2 MS2 6.47 0.011 4.16 0.3845 9.29 0.0096 67.15 0 
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FL2 SC1 33.66 0 7.27 0.0017 49.15 0 43.08 0 
FL2 SC2 13.87 0.0002 7.1 0.1308 27.61 0 15.33 0.0091 
GA1 AL1 5.77 0.0163 4.12 0.3896 14.64 0.0007 42.98 0 
GA1 AL2 3.21 0.0732 3.19 0.5268 12.75 0.0017 42.45 0 
GA1 AR1 8.4 0.0038 9.84 0.0432 30.97 0 39.12 0 
GA1 AR2 18.65 0 6.53 0.1631 77.95 0 71.96 0 
GA1 FL1 4.92 0.0266 8.29 0.0815 60.66 0 0.35 0 
GA1 FL2 9.58 0.002 2.25 0.6892 12.05 0.0024 96.12 0 
GA1 GA2 5.46 0.0195 7.82 0.0985 17.1 0.0002 36.65 0 
GA1 LA1 2.38 0.1225 2.01 0.0172 45.58 0 28.98 0 
GA1 LA2 6.85 0.0089 5.55 0.235 47.12 0 75.78 0 
GA1 MS1 10.09 0.0015 2.86 0.5807 19.59 0.0001 66.34 0 
GA1 MS2 0.82 0.3642 8.71 0.0688 21.96 0 48.52 0 
GA1 SC1 5.14 0.0234 7.71 0.1027 23.74 0 97.4 0 
GA1 SC2 0.81 0.3676 4.21 0.3782 10.36 0.0056 65.98 0 
GA2 AL1 12.97 0.0003 6.19 0.1853 20.38 0 12.45 0 
GA2 AL2 0.65 0.4193 1.58 0.8122 12.78 0.0017 53.23 0 
GA2 AR1 6.65 0.0099 4.15 0.3863 79.88 0 0.44 0 
GA2 AR2 15.27 0.0001 3 0.5579 138.93 0 7.38 0 
GA2 FL1 9.48 0.0021 1.86 0.7607 31.53 0 81.87 0 
GA2 FL2 0.95 0.3287 6.07 0.1942 14.19 0.0008 61.07 0 
GA2 GA1 0.32 0.5739 6.16 0.0028 7.36 0.0252 26.49 0.0004 
GA2 LA1 8.12 0.0044 5.58 0.2329 41.17 0 10.36 0 
GA2 LA2 0.49 0.4852 9.67 0.0464 24.05 0 63.89 0 
GA2 MS1 4.35 0.0371 1.5 0.8264 30.94 0 0.76 0 
GA2 MS2 3.35 0.0673 4.42 0.3519 20.41 0 37.63 0 
GA2 SC1 4.58 0.0324 3.59 0.4645 62.93 0 15.98 0 
GA2 SC2 17.96 0 9.01 0.0609 43.28 0 0.03 0 
LA1 AL1 14.96 0.0001 3.94 0.4145 23.55 0 86.81 0 
LA1 AL2 8.77 0.0031 1.48 0.8305 11.02 0.004 30 0.0001 
LA1 AR1 1.04 0.3088 2.9 0.0118 6.61 0.0368 79.77 0 
LA1 AR2 20.29 0 6.08 0.1932 22.7 0 54.62 0 
LA1 FL1 39.65 0 8.69 0.0692 61.11 0 8.34 0 
LA1 FL2 0.17 0.6813 0.04 0.0005 0.87 0.646 44.13 0 
LA1 GA1 11.88 0.0006 9.27 0.0547 16.52 0.0003 63.2 0 
LA1 LA1 11.87 0.0006 4.5 0.3426 20.31 0 48.56 0 
LA1 LA2 8.27 0.004 5.02 0.2854 12.49 0.0019 53.53 0 
LA1 MS1 3.14 0.0763 5.78 0.2165 3.91 0.1414 28.97 0.0001 
LA1 MS2 21.21 0 4.63 0.3269 25.22 0 66.57 0 
LA1 SC1 17.07 0 0.77 0.0293 20.39 0 79.36 0 
LA1 SC2 2.73 0.0987 4.63 0.3268 12.3 0.0021 51.61 0 
LA2 AL1 21.76 0 4.77 0.3112 27.16 0 30.52 0 
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LA2 AL2 14.81 0.0001 1.8 0.7717 19.82 0 77.26 0 
LA2 AR1 3.71 0.0542 6.55 0.1614 28.08 0 29.51 0 
LA2 AR2 32.25 0 3.28 0.5126 79.3 0 80.94 0 
LA2 FL1 62.27 0 8.07 0.0891 94.43 0 91.92 0 
LA2 FL2 1.67 0.1957 6.28 0.179 3.19 0.2027 33.52 0 
LA2 GA1 20.23 0 7.13 0.129 25.02 0 73.13 0 
LA2 GA2 12.28 0.0005 4.12 0.3895 16.11 0.0003 64.49 0 
LA2 LA1 8.27 0.004 4.71 0.3182 12.03 0.0024 22.43 0 
LA2 MS1 6.28 0.0122 6.13 0.1894 6.6 0.0368 71.08 0 
LA2 MS2 10.8 0.001 6.23 0.1824 11.94 0.0026 61.22 0 
LA2 SC1 15.06 0.0001 6.17 0.1868 19.73 0.0001 56.42 0 
LA2 SC2 0.5 0.4798 5.85 0.2102 8.8 0.0123 0.02 0 
MS1 AL1 1.42 0.234 7.16 0.1279 5.7 0.0579 63.98 0 
MS1 AL2 4.43 0.0354 4.07 0.3972 9.87 0.0072 10.24 0 
MS1 AR1 48.33 0 3.37 0.0096 74.3 0 63.04 0 
MS1 AR2 29.87 0 6.83 0.1452 106.99 0 43.61 0 
MS1 FL1 8.52 0.0035 5.24 0.2632 12.57 0.0019 5.64 0 
MS1 FL2 55.64 0 1.84 0.0186 56.32 0 2.97 0 
MS1 GA1 2.61 0.1065 3.96 0.0074 21.78 0 21.09 0 
MS1 GA2 21.47 0 7.66 0.1048 29.72 0 68.83 0 
MS1 LA1 2.13 0.1444 8.96 0.0621 11.96 0.0025 43.88 0 
MS1 LA2 6.99 0.0082 2.25 0.6907 14.66 0.0007 72.93 0 
MS1 MS2 1.41 0.2359 3.23 0.0001 5.03 0.0809 52.56 0 
MS1 SC1 18.59 0 7.62 0.1067 54.82 0 7.44 0 
MS1 SC2 12.74 0.0004 3.85 0.4272 31.54 0 19.34 0 
MS2 AL1 19.18 0 3.79 0.4352 25.35 0 64.32 0 
MS2 AL2 5.25 0.0219 5.86 0.2097 6.91 0.0316 47.31 0 
MS2 AR1 2.25 0.134 6.83 0.1453 12.83 0.0016 90.73 0 
MS2 AR2 28.86 0 7.42 0.1152 54.49 0 39.61 0 
MS2 FL1 43.17 0 0 0.0404 69.42 0 10.19 0 
MS2 FL2 0.46 0.4996 8.66 0.0703 0.57 0.7526 30.78 0.0001 
MS2 GA1 22.7 0 9.07 0.0594 28.09 0 77.22 0 
MS2 GA2 6.78 0.0092 3.59 0.4637 8.94 0.0114 48.13 0 
MS2 LA1 19.48 0 7.64 0.1056 54.02 0 12.47 0 
MS2 LA2 11.68 0.0006 0.84 0.9333 17.17 0.0002 65.58 0 
MS2 MS1 1.49 0.2223 8.4 0.001 1.84 0.3993 44.49 0 
MS2 SC1 19.6 0 2.84 0.5848 35.96 0 78.51 0 
MS2 SC2 1.24 0.2663 6.07 0.1941 7.17 0.0277 46.06 0 
SC1 AL1 2.15 0.1428 1.23 0.873 6.95 0.0309 33.18 0 
SC1 AL2 0.98 0.321 4.91 0.2968 5.47 0.0648 34.71 0 
SC1 AR1 3.78 0.0517 5.17 0.27 11.26 0.0036 93.48 0 
SC1 AR2 25.1 0 5.86 0.2098 60.22 0 79.7 0 
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SC1 FL1 5.78 0.0162 1.22 0.8754 11.29 0.0035 78.93 0 
SC1 FL2 2.72 0.099 1.24 0.024 15.98 0.0003 61.8 0 
SC1 GA1 0.29 0.593 5.94 0.2034 19.68 0.0001 87.45 0 
SC1 GA2 9.25 0.0024 2.75 0.6007 11.49 0.0032 27.47 0.0003 
SC1 LA1 4.09 0.0432 4.58 0.3329 22.82 0 71.47 0 
SC1 LA2 2.96 0.0854 9.8 0.0439 5.05 0.0802 36.9 0 
SC1 MS1 11.39 0.0007 3.1 0.5412 14.8 0.0006 38.55 0 
SC1 MS2 0.74 0.3905 2.34 0.674 6.23 0.0443 41.65 0 
SC1 SC2 11.07 0.0009 7.63 0.1061 19.2 0.0001 38.65 0 
SC2 AL1 12.06 0.0005 4.67 0.3228 19.46 0.0001 1.6 0 
SC2 AL2 10.67 0.0011 3.83 0.4292 12.88 0.0016 56.98 0 
SC2 AR1 14.85 0.0001 2.49 0.6461 31.98 0 69.14 0 
SC2 AR2 21.9 0 2.18 0.7019 84.65 0 99.79 0 
SC2 FL1 21.28 0 0.67 0.9546 28.72 0 84.25 0 
SC2 FL2 6.02 0.0141 6.36 0.1738 6.21 0.0448 26.49 0.0004 
SC2 GA1 13.77 0.0002 5.46 0.2431 13.81 0.001 92.12 0 
SC2 GA2 7.44 0.0064 4.4 0.3549 8.5 0.0142 26.89 0.0003 
SC2 LA1 23.58 0 1.85 0.7633 33.79 0 26.4 0 
SC2 LA2 16.51 0 5.42 0.2464 26.2 0 18.25 0 
SC2 MS1 14.7 0.0001 4.7 0.3193 15.78 0.0004 80.41 0 
SC2 MS2 17.23 0 0.76 0.9439 17.79 0.0001 12.9 0 
SC2 SC1 31.92 0 4.33 0.3634 53.43 0 78.92 0 
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Table 18: Pine Chip and Saw Bivariate Cointegration Tests 
 
REGIO
N 
AL
1 
AL
2 
AR
1 
AR
2 
FL 
1 
FL 
2 
GA
1 
GA
2 
LA
1 
LA
2 
MS
1 
MS
2 
SC
1 
SC
2 
 
AL1 NA 0.01 0.02 NA 
 
0 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.1 0.02 
0.1
8 0 
AL2 0.02 NA 0.02 NA 0 0 0 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.04 
0.1
3 
0.0
2 
AR1 0.03 0.02 NA NA 
0.0
1 
0.0
1 0.01 0.06 0 0.01 0 0 
0.0
1 
0.0
1 
AR2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
FL1 0.02 0.01 0.01 NA NA 0 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.02 
0.3
3 
0.0
1 
FL2 0 0 0.01 NA 0 NA 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.09 0.01 
0.1
1 0 
GA1 0.02 0 0.02 NA 
0.0
7 
0.0
2 NA 0.41 0.15 0.09 0.06 0 0.1 
0.0
1 
GA2 0.1 0.11 0.1 NA 
0.1
3 
0.0
4 0.31 NA 0.38 0.35 0.44 0.05 
0.6
6 
0.0
1 
LA1 0.18 0.11 0 NA 
0.1
4 
0.1
1 0.18 0.34 NA 0 0.03 0.02 
0.2
2 
0.2
8 
LA2 0.23 0.2 0.01 NA 0.2 
0.2
7 0.09 0.31 0 NA 0.04 0.02 0.1 
0.0
9 
MS1 0.23 0.26 0 NA 
0.2
6 
0.1
6 0.14 0.53 0.08 0.09 NA 0 0.2 
0.1
8 
MS2 0.02 0.04 0 NA 
0.0
1 
0.0
1 0 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 NA 
0.0
2 
0.0
2 
SC1 0.22 0.12 0 NA 
0.2
9 
0.0
7 0.09 0.63 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.02 NA 
0.1
3 
SC2 0.01 0.04 0.02 NA 
0.0
1 0 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.1 0.11 0.02 
0.1
4 NA 
 
Total 7 6 10 
 
5 9 6 4 3 3 3 12 2 8 
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Table 19: Pine Pulpwood Bivariate Cointegration Tests 
 
REGIO
N 
AL
1 
AL
2 
AR
1 
AR
2 
FL 
1 
FL 
2 
GA
1 
GA
2 
LA
1 
LA
2 
MS
1 
MS
2 
SC
1 
SC
2 
 
AL1 NA 0 0 0 
0.0
1 
0.1
1 0.01 0.03 0 0 0.01 0.01 
0.0
1 0 
AL2 0 NA 0.02 0.01 0 
0.0
3 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 
0.0
1 0 
AR1 0 0.03 NA 0.01 
0.2
2 
0.5
2 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.07 0.01 0 
0.0
2 
0.0
5 
AR2 0 0.02 0.01 NA 
0.0
7 0.4 0 0.15 0.01 0.01 0 0 
0.0
2 
0.0
2 
FL1 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.06 NA 0.1 0.04 0.14 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 
0.0
2 
0.0
7 
FL2 0.1 0.04 0.39 0.32 0.1 NA 0.35 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.22 0.13 
0.0
9 
0.0
3 
GA1 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.01 
0.0
7 
0.4
8 NA 0.3 0.01 0 0.03 0.03 
0.0
1 
0.0
2 
GA2 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.07 
0.0
7 
0.0
6 0.12 NA 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02 
0.0
3 
0.0
4 
LA1 0 0.02 0.01 0.01 
0.0
1 
0.2
3 0 0.06 NA 0.01 0 0 0 
0.0
1 
LA2 0 0.01 0.07 0.01 0 
0.1
2 0 0.12 0.01 NA 0.01 0 
0.0
1 
0.0
3 
MS1 0.01 0.03 0.01 0 
0.0
1 
0.2
3 0.01 0.19 0.01 0 NA 0.01 
0.0
1 
0.0
7 
MS2 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.1 0.01 0.02 0 0 0.01 NA 
0.0
1 
0.0
1 
SC1 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 
0.0
5 
0.1
7 0.02 0.1 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 NA 
0.0
5 
SC2 0 0 0.04 0.01 
0.0
6 
0.0
1 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 
0.0
1 NA 
 
Total 12 12 8 10 6 2 11 3 12 10 10 11 12 11 
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Table 20: Pine Saw Timber Pricing Behavior Tests 
 
REGIO
N 
AL
1 
AL
2 
AR
1 
AR
2 FL1 FL2 
GA
1 
GA
2 
LA
1 
LA
2 
MS
1 
MS
2 
SC
1 
SC
2 
 
AL1 NA 0.01 0.13 0.08 
0.0
1 
0.0
3 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.43 0.22 
0.0
1 
0.0
3 
AL2 0.01 NA 0.08 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.13 0.22 0.23 
0.0
3 0 
AR1 0.12 0.14 NA 0 
0.0
1 
0.0
3 0.15 0.14 0 0 0 0 
0.2
6 
0.1
6 
AR2 0.12 0.08 0 NA 
0.0
6 
0.1
6 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.01 0 
0.2
7 
0.1
1 
FL1 0 0 0.01 0.04 NA 
0.0
1 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.04 
0.0
1 0 
FL2 0.01 0 0.02 0.06 0 NA 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.06 
0.0
1 0 
GA1 0.05 0 0.16 0.13 
0.0
1 
0.0
4 NA 0.02 0.34 0.23 0.49 0.14 
0.0
2 0 
GA2 0.21 0 0.14 0.07 
0.0
2 
0.0
5 0.02 NA 0.34 0.18 0.47 0.11 
0.2
1 0 
LA1 0.23 0.13 0 0.05 
0.1
2 
0.2
6 0.31 0.34 NA 0.04 0.01 0 
0.2
7 
0.3
5 
LA2 0.2 0.23 0 0.02 
0.0
7 
0.1
8 0.24 0.18 0.02 NA 0.01 0.02 0.2 
0.2
4 
MS1 0.52 0.41 0 0.01 
0.1
9 
0.3
2 0.56 0.56 0.02 0.02 NA 0 0.3 
0.3
9 
MS2 0.22 0.32 0 0 
0.0
3 
0.0
8 0.12 0.1 0 0.01 0 NA 0.1 
0.0
7 
SC1 0.01 0.07 0.32 0.24 
0.0
1 
0.0
3 0.04 0.26 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.14 NA 
0.0
4 
SC2 0.04 0 0.18 0.08 0 0 0 0 0.36 0.24 0.33 0.09 
0.0
3 NA 
 
 
6 6 7 5 9 7 7 5 4 5 5 6 6 7 
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GLOSSARY OF TIMBER TERMS 
 
1. Consumption. The quantity of a commodity, such as pulpwood, utilized by a particular 
mill or group of mills. 
2. Domestic fuelwood. The volume of roundwood harvested to produce heat for residential 
settings. 
3. Exports. The volume of domestic roundwood utilized by mills outside the state wherein 
timber was cut. 
4. Growing-stock removals. The growing-stock volume removed from poletimber and 
sawtimber trees in the timberland inventory. (Note: Includes volume removed for 
roundwood products, logging residues, and other removals.) 
5. Growing-stock trees. Living trees of commercial species classified as sawtimber, 
poletimber, saplings, and seedlings. Growing-stock trees must contain at least one 12-foot 
or two 8-foot logs in the saw-log portion, currently or potentially (if too small at present 
to qualify). The log(s) must meet dimension and merchantability standards and have, 
currently or potentially, one-third of the gross board-foot volume in sound wood. 
6. Growing-stock volume. The cubic-foot volume of sound wood in growing-stock trees at 
least 5.0 inches d.b.h. from a 1-foot stump to a minimum 4.0-inch top d.o.b. of the central 
stem. 
7. Hardwoods. Dicotyledonous trees, usually broadleaf and deciduous. 
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Soft hardwoods. Hardwood species with an average specific gravity of 0.50 or less, such 
as gums, yellow poplar, cottonwoods, red maple, basswoods, and willows. 
Hard hardwoods. Hardwood species with an average specific gravity > 0.50, such as 
oaks, hard maples, hickories, and beech. 
8. Imports. The volume of domestic roundwood delivered to a mill or group of mills in a 
specific state but harvested outside that State. 
9. Industrial fuelwood. A roundwood product, with or without bark, used to generate 
energy at a manufacturing facility such as a wood-using mill. 
10. Industrial roundwood products. Any primary use of the main stem of a tree, such as 
saw logs, pulpwood, and veneer logs, intended to be processed into primary wood 
products such as lumber, wood pulp, sheathing, at primary wood-using mills 
11. Log. A primary forest product harvested in long, primarily 8-, 12-, and 16-foot lengths. 
12. Nonforest land. Land that has never supported forests and land formerly forested where 
timber production is precluded by development for other uses. 
13. Primary wood-using plants. Industries that convert roundwood products (saw logs, 
veneer logs, pulpwood, etc.) into primary wood products, such as lumber, veneer or 
sheathing, and wood pulp. 
14. Production. The total volume of known roundwood harvested from land within a state, 
regardless of where it is consumed. Production is the sum of timber harvested and used 
within a state, and all roundwood exported to other states. 
15. Pulpwood. A roundwood product that will be reduced to individual wood fibers by 
chemical or mechanical means. The fibers are used to make a broad generic group of pulp 
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products, which includes paper products, as well as fiberboard, insulating board, and 
paperboard. 
16. Receipts. The quantity or volume of industrial roundwood received at a mill or by a 
group of mills in a state, regardless of the geographic source. The volume of roundwood 
receipts is equal to the volume of roundwood retained in a State plus roundwood 
imported from other states. 
17. Retained. Roundwood volume harvested from and processed by mills within the same 
state. 
18. Roundwood (roundwood logs). Logs, bolts, or other round sections cut from trees for 
industrial manufacture or consumer uses. 
19. Roundwood chipped. Any timber cut primarily for industrial manufacture, delivered to 
nonpulpmills, chipped, and then sold to pulpmills for use as fiber. Includes tops, jump 
sections, whole trees, and pulpwood sticks. 
20. Roundwood product drain. That portion of total drain used for a product. 
21. Roundwood products. Any primary product, such as lumber, veneer, composite panels, 
poles, pilings, pulp, or fuelwood, that is produced from roundwood. 
22. Salvable dead trees. Standing or downed dead trees that were formerly growing stock 
and considered merchantable. Trees must be at least 5.0 inches d.b.h. to qualify 
23. Saw log. A roundwood product, usually 8 feet in length or longer, processed into a 
variety of sawn products such as lumber, cants, pallets, railroad ties, and timbers. 
24. Saw-log portion. The part of the bole of sawtimber trees between a 1-foot stump and the 
saw-log top. 
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25. Saw-log top. The point on the bole of sawtimber trees above which a conventional saw 
log cannot be produced. The minimum saw-log top is 7.0 inches d.o.b. for softwoods and 
9.0 inches d.o.b. for hardwoods for FIA standards. 
26. Sawtimber-size trees. Softwoods 9.0 inches d.b.h. and larger and hardwoods 11.0 inches 
d.b.h. and larger. 
27. Sawtimber volume. Growing-stock volume in the saw-log portion of sawtimber-sized 
trees in board feet (International ¼-inch rule). 
28. Softwoods. Coniferous trees, usually evergreen, having leaves that are needles or scale 
like. 
29. Timberland. Forest land capable of producing 20 cubic feet of industrial wood per acre 
per year and not withdrawn from timber utilization. 
30. Timber product output. The total volume of roundwood products from all sources plus 
the volume of byproducts recovered from mill residues (equals roundwood product 
drain). 
31. Timber products. Roundwood products and byproducts. 
32. Timber removals. The total volume of trees removed from the timberland inventory by 
harvesting, cultural operations such as stand improvement, land clearing, or changes in 
land use. (Note: Includes roundwood products, logging residues, and other removals.) 
33. Tree. Woody plants having one erect perennial stem or trunk at least 3 inches d.b.h., a 
more or less definitely formed crown of foliage, and a height of at least 13 feet (at 
maturity) 
34. Production = Retained + Exports  
35. Receipts = Retained + Imports 
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